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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1. Meaning and relevance 
of the concept of subjectivity 
The title of this thesis reflects the primary 
interest of this investigation as being the subjectivist 
position of the philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead. 
Although it would be presumptious to define at the out-
set Whitehead's concept of subjectivity, it is necessary 
to define what is meant bw 'subjectivity.' 'Subjectivity' 
pertains to that which is subjective; and 'subjective• 
pertains to the characteristics and attributes of the 
subject. But what is the subject? In a final sense, 
this is the question which forms the central motif of 
this investigation, viz, what is the nature of the 
subject in the philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead? 
In general, there have been two views of the sub-
ject in the history of philosophy. One has been that 
the subject is that which supports qualities, attributes 
and relations. This view is in the best of the Aria-
totelian tradition. Hence, in this view, the subject 
is often considered as substance. Another has been that 
the subject is -the thinking mind or ego and that qualities 
and relations are essentially attitudes of the mi nd or 
subject which it projects into the external or phenomenal 
2 
world. This is in the Kantian tradition. 
In both views, however, the subject is conceived 
as the primary object o~ analysis, that is, the subject 
is the primary datum ~or philosophical investigation 
and speculation. It will be observed that it is at 
this point that Whitehead's concept of subjectivity 
emerges. The problem seems to resolve itself into the 
question of whether the subject should be conceived as 
the experiencer o~ the experienced. For example, in 
modern philosophy the subjectivity o~ the experient be-
came a central issue with the philosophy o~ Descartes. 
Since Descartes' famous premise, "Cogito, ergo~," 
the subject as an experient has been prominent in all 
o~ philosophy. In contemporary philosophy the problems 
of the subject have been of paramount importance, and 
they have not been avoided even when an e~~ort to do 
so has been made. 
Anyone hav1.ng · a casual acquaintance with the philos-
ophy of Whitehead cannot classify his position on the 
subject according to the two general views mentioned 
above. Whitehead's philosophy of the subject clearly 
does not ~it exclusively into either. A very elementary 
statement such as "the notion o~ material, as funda-
mental, has been replaced by that o~ organic synthesis"! 
l. SMW, 157. Unless otherwise noted all rererences 
will be to works o~ Whitehead, the abbrevia cions o~ 
which are explained in the bibliography. 
defies the above classifications. Becau·se of Whi te• 
head's apparently novel treatment of the subject, it 
is relevant that an investigation of his concept of 
subjectivity be made. 
2. Previous literature on the subject 
The material that has been written concerning 
Whitehead's philosophy is indeed voluminous. Because 
of this the listings in the bibiiography have been 
selected with certain ends in mind. Primarily, the 
3 
books and articles listed are concerned either in whole 
or in part with Whitehead's theory of actual entities. 
Other books and articles have been included because 
they bear on topics of general interest which might be 
aroused by this investigation. These listings are usuaDy 
distinctive by their titles. 
Very little has been written about either the 
concept of subjectivity per ~or the subject per ~ 
in Whitehead's philosophy. There is, however, a volum-
inous amount of material concerning the theory of actual 
entities. This, of course, entails the concept of sub-
jectivity. Much also has been written concerning the 
functions and attributes of the subject such as "pre-
hension" and "subjective form." There has been at 
least one article written pertaining to the "subject" 
in Whitehead's philosophy.l This article is of suffiC-ient 
1. cr. Gentry, Art. {1944). 
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significance to be dealt with extensively in the final 
chapter. 
3. Method of investigation 
The method employed in this investigation is basi-
cally synoptic with a striving toward a final synthesis 
of the concept of subjectivity. The notion of the sub-
ject will be evolved from the philosophic position of 
Whitehead as it is presented in Process and Reality. 
The material in the thesis is based predominantly on 
this work by Whitehead, for it represents the most 
organized and comprehensive account of his thought. 
Science and the Modern World preceded Process and Reality 
and involves the notions of the philosophy of organism 
in germ only; Adventures of Ideas succeeded Process and 
Reality, and the ideas presented there are further 
interpretation of the philosophic scheme presented in 
Process and Reality. This does not mean that any one 
of these books, Science and the Modern World, Process 
and Reality, or Adventures of Ideas, can be substituted 
for the other, or that any one is more important from 
the standpoint of the whole of Whitehead's thought. 
Process and Reality is, however, the most important 
work t·or the purposes of this investigation. Much of 
the germ of the thought presented in Process and Reality 
may be found in the earlier works. Concept of Nature, 
Symbolism: Its Meaning and Effect, and Function of 
Reason are particularly important in gaining an under-
standing of the historical development of Whitehead's 
thought. 
An adequate analysis of the concept of subjectivity 
is possible only through an analysis of the functions 
of the subject; and an analysis of the subject is best 
achieved through a synoptic analysis of the basic 
metaphysical notions of the philosophy of organism. 
For this reason, the second chapter is primarily con-
cerned with evolving the concept of the subject from 
the total metaphysical scheme. A brief account of the 
method Whitehead uses is included! for in the method 
are found some of the primary notions entertained in 
the scheme itself. Because of the complexity of the 
"Categoreal Scheme," the categories are developed rather 
than stated and then explained. As a result, not 
all of the categories are found to be important to the 
motif of the thesis. Those which have direct bearing 
on the concept of the subject are dealt with expensively; 
those which do not are mentioned in footnotes whenever 
something relevant to them is stated. In chapter three 
the attributes and functions of the subject are analyzed 
in detail. This se~ms to give a clearer understanding 
l. cr. section one, Chapter II. 
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o£ the concept of subjectivity than most other possible 
courses. There are two aspects of the subject which 
are open to analysis.: its genes;ts and its morphology. 
In this investigation the only concern is with the genetic 
analysis of the subject. The final chapter is a syn-
thesis of the factors which have emerged in the two 
preceding chapters. Included also a~e some crttioisms 
o£ critics of Whitehead in so £ar as they are relevant 
to the object of the thesds. 
A word also should be said about the highly tech-
nical, and sometimes obtuse, language Whitehead employs. 
There have been many objectors to Whitehead's vocabulary,l 
but the objections seem to be only partially justified.2 
It must be admitted, however, that Whitehead's vocabulary 
is not simple. For this reason, in many instances, the 
ideas are developed before naming them. In t his way 
the technical terms become more readily accessible. 
Some difficulty is found in the fact that many of White-
head's ideas are either novel or subtle variants of those 
which have become common coin. In some instances the 
terms are defined in prevalent philosophic language. 
The final appeal is, as always, to the context of White-
head's philosophy; and, as the case often is, the 
understanding of the relations of ideas develops co-
l. Cf. e.g., Urban, Art. (1938). 
2. Cf. below, pp. 15, 16. 





WHITEHEAD'S PHILOSOPHIC POSITION 
1. Speculative outlook 
Speculative philosophy is defined by Whitehead 
the endeavor to frame a coherent, logical, 
necessary system of general ideas in 
terms of which every element of our 
experience can be interpreted ••• the 
philosophical scheme should be coherent, 
logical, and, in respect to its in-
terpretation, applicable and adequate.l 
This definition on the surface seems to be a quite 
ordinary but well formulated definition. It is more 
than a definition, however, for in it is found the 
fundamental presuppositions of the philosophy of or-
ganism. The presuppositions are to be found in fur-
ther definitions of the various terms employed. 
'Logical' is to be construed in its usual sense, 
including inference, consistency, lack of contradiction, 
and logical constructions applicable to specific in-
stances. The significance of the term 'logical' is that 
notions or concepts concerning logic must have a place 
also in the philosophic scheme.2 
•Coherence• has the meaning of consistent inter-
1. _ Pa, '.4. 
2. PR, 5. 
relatedness, but the idea of cohesion sometimes as-
sociated with coherence has special emphasis. The 
9 
terms employed in the philosophy of organism are so 
related that they cannot be separated one from the other 
and still have meaning. The notions of the philosophic 
scheme have meaning only when in relation to each 
other. This principle not only applies to the tenets 
of the philosophy of organism, but it is the one major 
premise of the philosophy; no entity, or 'fact,' of 
the universe is capable of being conceived in complete 
abstraction from the whole of the universe.l This is 
the basis of the ontological principle which will be 
discussed more fully in chapter three. 
The terms 'logical' and 'coherent' express the 
ideal that the philosophic scheme should be rational, 
and, equally important, that the scheme should be 
capable of application to reality. In this sense the 
scheme should be "adequate and applicable" in the in-
terpretation of experience. This is what Whitehead 
calls the "empirical side" of speculative philosophy.2 
The confines of experience .which the scheme should be 
able to interp.ret include all experience which is 
known, or "communicates with immediate matter of fact."3 
One of the chief weaknesses of all philosophic schemes 
1. PR, 5. 
2. PR, 5. 
3. PR, 5. 
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is that each of them has not been able to account for 
some aspects of experience.! The philosophy of organism 
seeks to interpret all communicable experience. The 
necessity for universality in the scheme precludes that 
there is an essence of the universe which "forbids 
relationships beyond itself, as a violation of its 
rationality."2 
The "general ideas" are to be understood as the 
first principles to which everything may be referred. 
The problem is whether any such scheme can be constructed 
with any validity and accuracy. It further may be asked 
if there are any first principles, and, if there are, 
whether they can be known. It must be assumed that 
there are discoverable first principles if any of 
the experience of man is to be intelligible. 
The difficulty is to find these metaphysical first 
principles and to formulate them into intelligible 
symbols after they are found. Language at this point 
is hoplessly deficient, so "philosophers can never 
hope finally to formulate these metaphysical first 
principles.") The first principles, however, "may be 
captured by a flash of insight."4 The best thing that 
can be done is to formulate the first principles accord-
ing to both an ideal and our immediate experience. 
1. PR, 9. 
2. PR, 6. 
3. . Pij, ·6. 
4. PR, 6. 
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The difficulty is not altogether within the confines 
of language. Empirical investigation has often been 
too rigid and thus unable to account for the incon-
sistencies it discovers. Imagination must be given 
free play whereby it can contrast the actual inconsis-
tencies with the ideal in the imagination.l Without 
imagination to supply something different from factual 
observation, there would be no progress. A "negative 
judgment is the peak of mentality" for it is the result 
of comparison.2 
Imagination is not to be construed to include 
any kind of bizarre thinking. Imagination must be 
founded on empirical observation, and there must always 
be a return to the data of observation. This constitutes 
the first requisite of speculative philosophy.3 What-
ever the data of the initial observation, the generali-
zations that ultimately are made must be applicable to 
other data outside of the scope from which they orig-
inated. 
The second requirement of speculative philosophy 
is strict conformity to log ic and coherence.4 The 
imaginative construction of a .system must be logical 
without any deviation. Mathematics is a perfect example 
1. PR, 1. 3. PR, 8. 
2. PR, 7. 4. PR, 8-9. 
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of imaginative thought generalizing from observed data, 
and following logic to its optimum. 1 Coherence 1 here 
has the same meaning as mentioned earlier. The impor-
tance of coherence cannot be over emphasized; it "is 
the great preservative of rationalistic sanity."l In-
coherence is the disconnection of first principles, as 
is found in the philosophy of Descartes which asserts 
that there are two kinds of substance, corporeal and 
mental. 
In the concept of coherence is found another of 
the fundamental presuppositions of Whitehead in his 
criticism of Descartes and Spinoza. There was no reason 
why Descartes' system could not have been a one sub-
stance system, either corporeal or mental. The asser-
tion of a two or poly substance universe is not only 
self contradictory, but it violates the principle of 
coherence. Spinoza was more coherent by postulating 
only one substance and investigating_ its attributes and 
modes. The insertion of modes of the substance, or 
substance quality, is essential in order to make the 
system applicable to all experience, but the concept of 
modes as used by Spinoza was a new substance to the 
universe, and therefore incoherent. 
The philosophy of organism diverges from Spinoza 
1. PR, 9. 
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on this point and also in the respect that the ultimate 
substance is different. For Spinoza the subject-pre-
dicate form of thought· was the essential feature in the 
substance-quality concept; Whitehead, rather, emphasizes 
dynamic process and the solidarity of the universe on 
this basis. 
The coherence, which the system seeks 
to preserve, is the discovery that the 
process, or concrescence, of any one 
actual entity involves the other actual 
entities among its components. In this 
way the obvious solidaritl of the world 
receives its explanation. 
Where the philosophy of Spinoza makes fact ultimate, 
Whitehead makes the process of creativity ultimate. 
The two primary requisites of speculative philosophy 
are those recognized by Parmenides and Plato: the 
scheme must be logical, and, it must provide a "matrix 
from which true propositions applicable to particular 
circumstances can be derived. 11 2 
Philosophy's purpose is to abstract from all ob-
served data generalizations which hold throughout all 
experience. This has been the history of philosophy. 
At the inception of philosophy in the ancient Greek 
culture, philosophy was not differentiated from science; 
and today whenever a new field of science appears with 
novel notions about some particular phase of experience, 
1. PR, 10. 
2. PR, 13. 
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it is considered as being in the most part philosophical. 
Each succeeding era of science invalidates some of 
the previously long held propositions; such has been the 
fate of Newtonian physics. In philosophy, the same 
occurs. The generalizations of philosophy are for-
mulated from observable data, and as new data are col-
lected, the generalizations change. Science is prone 
to function in a vacuum, but the first principles of 
science can not be defined apart from wider generalities. 
One of the functions of philosophy "is to challenge the 
half-truths constituting the scientific first principles."l 
Altho~gh there is brute fact, any observed fact has 
meaning only when interpreted or integrated into a 
larger system. Facts do not exist in and of themselves, 
and "whenever we attempt to eXpress the matter of immed:i-
ate experience, we find that its understanding leads 
us beyond itself ••• to the universals in ••• which its 
definiteness is exhibited. 11 2 
Whitehead objects to any view which separates the 
various branches of knowledge and to any position which 
dogmatically purports itself to be the only productive . 
endeavor of man. Every field of inquiry yields a con-
tribution to the total perspective of knowledge. and, 
in the Cartesian tradition, all clear and distinct 
1. PR, 15. 
2. PR, 21. 
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thought offers something. Here, again, is the ontological 
principle operating in Whitehead's thought. Whitehead 
follows the Platonic principle that there is a relation 
between the thinking processes of man and the structure 
or reality. 
The interaction between science and philosophy 
is quite important. The philosophical scheme should 
be based upon the facts or science coupled with the 
ideal set forth, and, reciprocally, scientific propo-
sitions should meet the test of philosophical inves-
tigation. The observable data or experience should be 
explainable within the rramework of the proposed philo-
sophical scheme, thus, "the verification or a rational-
istic scheme is to be sought in ita general success, 
and not in the peculiar certainty, or initial clarity, 
or its rirat principles."l 
One of the rundamental problems of any philosophic 
scheme is the language in which it is expressed. The 
technical set of terms developed by philosophy through-
out its history is an effort to "obtain explicit expres-
sion of general ideas presupposed by the racts or ex-
perience."2 The difficulty is that language seldom, 1r 
ever, expresses well defined propositions. One of the 
aims of philosophy is to rectiry this dericiency in its 
1. PR, 12. 
2. PR, 18. 
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language. The attempt to accomplish this becomes cir-
cular, for the beginning must be with a well defined 
proposition about a known certainty, and so far as human 
knowledge is concerned, there are no "axiomatic cer-
tainties from which to start."l 
It becomes necessary, then, to begin with general 
statements and proceed with eluclda~ion of the vague 
·...:-_._.-
first generalizations. The proced~e - of elucidation 
should better define the meanings to be attributed to 
the terms employed. It is futile to hope, however, 
that any elucidation ever will make the terms exact 
statements, for "no verbal statement is the adequate 
expression of a proposition."2 Any statement concerning 
fact can be understood only in relation to the meta-
physical structure behind it, and the metaphysical 
structure can be understood only in relation to the 
fact immediately experienced. The understanding of 
both the metaphysical principle and the experience 
requires a "leap of the imagination,") the same ima-
gination referred to earlier. 
Whitehead's emphasis on the indeterminate character 
of language is a defense of the highly technical terms 
he uses. He develops an exacting vocabulary in order 
to obtain that "explicit expression of general ideas 
1. PR, 19. ). PR, 20. 
2. PR, 20. 
presupposed by the facts of experience "l which is the 
historical purpose of philosophical language. With 
all the emphasis on exactitude of language, Whitehead 
nevertheless allows many of his terms to become fluid 
and flexible in the developement of his thought. In 
regard to his language and his metaphysical scheme, 
17 
Whitehead is modest in his claims. He does not claim 
that his terms are completely unambiguous nor that the 
philosophy of organism is an adequate metaphysical ex-
pression of experience. He says, "A precise language 
must await a completed metaphysical knowledge ••• the 
doctrines in question LPhilosophy of organism! supply 
a closer approach to fully expressed propositions."2 
The role of speculative philosophy is to be found 
in the annals of human progress. Many have been the 
claims that man should attend chiefly to the explicit 
description of experience and avoid any interpretation, 
for interpretation, by its nature of indefiniteness, 
does not contribute to the knowledge of man. The only 
thing that offers any knowledge is the finality afforded 
by description of experience. The point against such an 
objection to speculative philosophy is that there are 
"no brute, self-contained matters of fact,"3 and that 
in the pages of any scientific writing there is an 
1. PR, 18. 
2. PR, 18. 
3. PR, 21. 
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abundance or interpretation. Interpretation, as pointed 
out earlier, is necessary ir brute ract is to be under-
stood, and the most comprehensive interpretation or 
ract is metaphysical interpretation. In a sense, all 
interpretation is metaphysical, ror any generalization 
by its nature contains directives to other racts or 
experience. Speculative philosophy serves the function 
of interpretation or experience. The test of achieve-
ment is not rinality of decision, but it is progress. 
In the act or scientific investigation and inter-
pretation, there is an unavoidable amount of subjectivism 
in selecting from the data observed that which is utilized 
in interpretation. Metaphysical speculation .serves as 
a correction to such selectiveness by recovering the 
~totality obscured by the selection.nl The selective-
ness of individual experience has a "moral" content in 
that it follows the dictates of importance or ration-
ality. In any investigation or observation, the in-
vestigator is a sensitive, experiencing subject, and by 
his rational outlook he converts the sensitive experience 
into moral directions. "Morality of outlook is in-
separably conjoined with generality or outlook."2 In 
science emotions become a part of the data, whereas in 
other fields or experience the emotions are the subject 
1. PR, 22. 
2. PR, 23. 
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of the experience. It is the business of philosophy to 
combine science and all other areas of experience into 
a rationalistic scheme of thought in an attempt to 
find justification of brute experience. 
Whitehead's position in regard to speculative 
philosophy is thus made clear. The motive of existence 
is abstract thought reacting with sensitive experience, 
and abstract thought is self-justifying for the very 
process of abstraction admits comparison with exper-
ience. "Speculative boldness must be balanced by com-
plete humility before logic, and before fact ••• The use-
ful function of philosophy is to promote ••• general 
systematization of civilized thought."l 
2. Categoreal Scheme 
This section is an explanation of the primary 
metaphysical scheme as presented in Process and Reality. 
The explanation will be more developmental than ex-
planatory, however, for a statement of the metaphysical 
scheme in the form of categories is wholly unintelligible 
by itself. For this reason the order of presentation 
is reversed from that found in Process and Reality. 
The initial task is to set forth definitions of terms 
which are used quite extensively in the scheme and which 
form an integral part of it. Through the definitions, 
l. PR, 2S-26. 
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which include necessary elucidation and application of 
the terms to specific instances, the main categories 
will emerge in a more intelligible fashion than if 
they were stated in concise form at the beginning. 
The terms Whitehead uses will be equated initially 
to more familiar terms of historical philosophic language, 
although such an equation is illegitimate. It seems 
necessary to do this in order to avoid circularity, but 
it must be remembered that the concepts behind White-
head's terms are fundamentally different from the f~­
iliar terms used here. Through the elucidation of the 
term by the utilization of a more familiar term the 
differentiation will appear. Thus, although the term 
"eternal object" is defined by the terms 'universal,' 
1idea,1 or '"'-'form,' the essential nature of an "eternal 
object" is neither 'universal,' 'idea,• 'form,• nor all, 
nor a combination of the three terms. The procedure is 
justified; it would be futile to define a unicorn as a 
unicorn for there is no contrasting concept. It is 
better first to define a unicorn as a mythical horse 
with a horn and then proceed to further differentiating 
characteristics. 
There are four basic categories in Whitehead's 
metaphysics, three of which are subdivided into further 
categories. Each of the four categories will be con-
sidered as a whole with exceptions being noted only 
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when it seems necessary. For example, of the four 
basic categories only the second category, the Categories 
of Existence, will be initially discussed; and of the 
eight Categories of Existence, only the first, second, 
fourth and fifth categories will be primarily discussed 
with reference to the remaining four only for the pur-
pose of completing the whole metaphysical scheme. The 
awkwardness which would result from attempting to give 
a generalized view of all the categories would serve 
only to confuse and possib.ly detract from the central 
motif of the !nvestigation. 
Thales' quesbion, "What is the stuff out of which 
everything is made?" set the course for the western 
tradition in philosophy, and as yet the question has 
not been answered adequately. Although the question 
presupposes many other problems, the point of departure 
in the consideration of Whitehead's answer must be with 
the term 'stuff.' Any explanation of the order of the 
universe must include in its consideration, and, indeed, 
start with, the phenomenon called 'matter,' brute fact, 
or material. The question then becomes, "What is the 
essential nature of stuff?" Although the answer to this 
question from the standpoint of Whitehead necessarily 
involves answers to the questions presupposed in Thales' 
question, it will be sufficient for the present to 
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deal only with the nature of 'stuff.' 
The idea of stuff in scientific thinking up to the 
eighteenth century, and in philosophic thought even to-
day, is explained in terms of concreteness. Matter is 
the concrete thing, and everything that can not be ex-
plained in terms of matter is not concrete and there-
fore is illusory to the senses, and must be described 
in terms of ether or a combination of terms sufficiently 
vague to convey the idea of immaterialness. In the 
dualistic philosophies, there is mind and matter, a 
dichotomy of essential existences, and in the material-
istic and idealistic philosophies concrete matter is 
and is not, respectively. All three philosophies 
essentially exclude any kind of change or process from 
their conceptions of stuff. Either there is a dualistic 
conjunction of matter and mind, or there is an exclusive 
disjunction of matter or mind. The tendency to exclude 
change in some of these systems of thought renders 
those which exclude change wholly unintelligible in 
relation to empirical data.l 
It is for this reason that Whitehead emphasizes 
the concept of process in Science and the Modern World,2 
for he thus restores the principle of change as embodied 





3. Compare Leibniz's de-
scription of "monads." 
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universe is process. The material aspect of the uni-
verse is itself process, or becoming. "The actual 
world is a process, and that ••• process is the becoming 
of actual entities."l The emphasis on matter or idea 
as exclusively and independently real is what White-
head calls the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness."2 
•Actual entity• is the term Whitehead uses to 
denote the basic concrete thing of the univer se; an 
actual entity is the final reality, the ~ verae. 
The important thing about an actual entity is that it 
cannot be equated to the more common terms for material-
ity. "An actual entity is a process, and is not de-
scribable in terms of the morphology of a •stuff.•"3 
Simple, indivisible pieces of matter do not exist at 
all, nor do independent units of reality exist, for 
there is no atom of existence which is not in relation 
to some other atom of existence in some way. The exact 
way in which actual entities enter into relation with 
each other will be discussed later under a consideration 
of 'prehension.' 
Actual entities are those things which must be 
considered as 'given• in the deliberation of any science 
or philosophy. Actual entities are those things which 
1. PR, 33. 3. PH, 65. 
2. SMW, Chapter III. 
~~ and cannot be divided into other matters of fact. 
The final, or least divisible, facts of the universe 
are actual entities. All considerations of things 
other then actual entities are an abstraction from them. 
"'Actual entities• ••• are the final real things of which 
the world is made up. There is no going behind actual 
entities to find anything more real."l 
The notion of 1giveness' has no meaning unless 
correlated to that which is not g iven. Thus for any 
given thing there is a reference to more than just the 
datum in question; there is reference to all other data. 
The process of determin~ng the given and the not-given 
is an act of decision. Decision does not imply or 
involve consciousness, in Whitehead's restricted use 
of 'consciousness,' except in isolated cases; it is 
merely an act of separating out, or •cutting off.' 
Decision as applied to actuality is the definite realizing 
of one and exclusion of other possible alternatives. 
Thus for any thing that is given, there is a process of 
"procuring limitation."2 The word •actual' in the 
term 'actual entity• refers to the real thing as it 
exists, and the real fact of the real thing is the act 
of decision in the real thing. 
The word 'entity' is a general term referring to 
1. PR, 27. 
2. PR, 68. 
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the indivisible unit, but the indivisible unit arises 
rrom decisions for it by other entities and the de-
cisions it provides for other entities. Thus , 'entity' 
in general is the "potentiality for process. "l An 
actual entity may be conceived as decision and poten-
tiality for decision.2 Thus, "where there is no decision 
involving exclusion, there is no giveness.n3 
The understanding of what Whitehead means by the 
term 'actual entity' requires an entirely new perspec-
tive. The lines of demarcation that exist in traditional 
thinking about environment cannot be employed. In the 
prevailing modes of thought the custom is to isolate 
matter from all other things and consider it alone. 
As stated previously, this cannot be done in the philo-
sophy of organism. The classic notions of philosophy 
derived from Aristotle divide the universe into distinct 
classes of things without any relevance whatsoever te 
anything else. For this reason, previous modes of 
thought required that things be described in circular 
terms, or terms that were equivalent. For Whitehead, 
a description of an actual entity requires the descrip-
tion of process, giveness, potentiality, and decision; 
and description of these things requires descriptions 
1. PR, 68. 3. PR, 69. 
2. cr. the fourth Category 
of Explanation, PR, 33. 
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of feelings, relations, and other actual entities. This 
is the notion of the ontological principle which is the 
foundation of the philosophy of organism. 
The ontological principle for Whitehead has its 
implicit origin with Plato, but explicitly with Des-
cartes. The doctrine of Descartes, that for every thought 
there is a referent to that thought or idea, is ex-
tended by Whitehead to apply to all aspects of the 
universe, and not to the thinking processes of man alone. 
Every entity is related to every other entity, and 
either we know something of the remote 
occasion by the cognition which is it-
self an element of the immediate oc-
casion, or we know nothing. Accord-
ingly, the full universe, disclosed 
for every variety of experience, is a 
universe in which every detail enters 
into its proper relationship with the 
immediate occasion.l 
If occasions are not related to all others, i.e., if 
they are independent, there can be no determinate truth. 
It was noted earlier that the term 'actual entity• 
referred to decision, and was the name for the process 
of decision arising amid potentiality. This descrip-
tion now becomes clear in the ontological principle. 
The ontological principle asserts that "decision is 
referable to one or more actual entities, because in 
separation from actual entities t here is nothing,merely nonenti~.n2 
1. SMW, 27. 
2. PR, 68. 
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The ontological principle is the only avenue whereby 
the universe may be described with rationality. It 
explains the universe in terms of actual entities and 
thus embraces the concept of solidarity of the universe. 
The fundamental notion of the ontological principle is 
that "everything is positively somewhere in actuality, 
and in potency everywhere."l The reasons for a thing 
are to be found in the thing itself. 
The idea of actual entities is totally bound up 
ip the ontological principle. An actual entity arises 
through decisions for it by actual entities which as a 
result of them circumscribe the real potential for 
other actual entities.2 Decision is a process of se-
parating off, thus constituting the given and the not 
given. "Thus the ontological principle is the first 
stage in constituting a theory embracing the notions 
of 'actual entity,' 'giveness, 1 and 1process. 1 "3 The 
ontological principle is the foundation of all of the 
philosophy of organism, and its elucidation shall con-
sist in all of the following consideration. Thus far 
in this investigation it has proved to be the basis of 
the first Category of Existence which is Actual Entities; 
and the first Category of Explanation: "That the actual 




Cf. the second Category 
of Explanation, PR, 33. 
3. PR, 68. 
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of actual entities."l 
The relationship between actual entities is a 
further exemplification of the ontological principle. 
Actual entities are a process of relationship referential 
to each other, and thus "each actual entity is conceived 
as an act of experience arising out of data."2 The 
constitution of an actual entity is influenced by past 
actual entities, and, conversely, the constitution of 
one actual entity affects the coming of other actual 
entities. This relationship between actual entities 
is a process of 'feeling' the data, or other entities. 
The experiencing subject, or actual entity, arises from 
the data it feels and constructs ita own nature from the 
way in which the data are felt by it. Feeling is the 
process of data traversing from that which is objective, 
to that which is subjective. It is a matter of appro-
priation. 
The relationship constituting this feeling is a 
definite referential bond between actual entities and 
is called 'prehension' by Whitehead. •Prehension• as 
a term is used in its usual sense of •seizing' or 'grasp-
ing hold' but it has much broader connotations and ap-
plications. The first essential characteristic of 
'prehension' is that it is an active process. For this 
1. PR, 33. 
2. PR, 65. 
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reason the word •relation' is rejected; 'relation' 
suggests a static morphology and thus fails to express 
activity. •Apprehend' approximates the intended mean-
ing, but it does not suggest a physical act per ~ 
while 'prehension' does. This is precisely the failing 
of the two terms. Both are too exclusive. There is a 
further difficulty with 'apprehension' which is not 
the case with the use of the word•prehension.• 'Ap-
prehension' suggests consciousness in the cognitive 
sense of the word, and this consciousness is not a factor 
in all actual entities. 'Prehension' more clearly 
conveys the notion Whitehead wishes to express. 
The theory of prehensions will be more fully 
developed in chapter three or this investigation, and 
it will be sufficient at this point to give only a brief 
characterization of the nature of prehensions. An 
actual entity is an act of experiencing and absorbs 
those things experienced into its own nature. This is 
not a one way process; it is reciprocal, so that each 
"actual entity has a perfectly definite bond with each 
item in the universe. This determinate bond is its 
prehension of that item.»l 
A prehension is the bond Qr relationship of feel-
ing between actual ent-ities and originates in the pro-
1. PR, 66. 
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cess or becoming or actual entities. It thus involves 
in its nature all the characteristics or the actual 
entities in question. nA prehension reproduces in it-
selr the general characteristics or an actual entity: 
it is rererent to an external world.nl Prehensions 
thus have an existence of their own, but not an in-
dependent existence. They are "incomplete partialities 11 
and only a "subordinate element in an actual entity.n2 
There are two types of prehensions by reason of 
the 'given• character of actual entities. Thus far 
only 'positive' prehensions have been the topic of 
discussion. These are the 'feelings' which result from 
the decision of including data as a positive contri-
bution to the internal or subjective constitution of the 
becoming actual entity. T-here is also a relationship 
between the actual entity and those data which are 
excluded from being positive elements of the actual 
entity. Thus, there is a •negative• prehension which 
is the definite exclusion of data from t he actual 
entity. 
A prehension thus consists at least of two factors: 
the actual entity in question and the datum which is 
prehended. This is a part of the eleventh Category of 
Explanation and constitutes the first two Categories 
i.. PR, 28. 
2. PR, 29. 
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of Existence: Actual Entities and Prehensions. The 
discussion of pr~sions also reveals the eighth, ninth, 
tenth, and twelfth Categories of Explanation which are 
as follows: 
(viii) That two descriptions are re-
quired for an actual entity: (a) one 
which is analytical of its potentiali-
ty for 'objectification' in the becom-
ing of other actual entities, and (b) 
another which is analytical of the 
process which ronstitutes its own be-
coming. 
(ix) That how an actual entity be-
comes constit-Utes what the actuar-
entity is. ----
(x) That the first analysis of an 
actual entity, into its most concrete 
elements, discloses it to be a con-
crescence of prehensions, which have 
originated in its process of becoming. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • (xii) That the~e are two species of 
prehensions: (a) 'positive prehensions' 
which are termed •feelings,' and (b) 
•negative prehensions' which are said to 
'eliminate from feeling.tl 
The term 'concrescence• as it appears in the 
tenth Category of Explanation above is the term applied 
to the process of the many prehensions and data coming 
together to form a complete unity which is an actual 
entity. The word is a derivation from the Latin con-
........... 
crescere meaning a growing together. Whitehead employs 
the term as pertaining to the nature of immediate ex-
perience as opposed to abstraction or generality. Thus, 
when an act of experience, actual entity, becomes 
1. PR, 34-35. 
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fully developed and complete, it is real or concrete.l 
In Whitehead' s terms, n .rconcre s cence ' is the name for 
the process in which ••• many things Lacquiri7 an indi-
vidual unity."2 Thus, an actual entity is concrete be-
cause it is a concresence of many things, and, "an in-
stance of concrescence is ••• an •actual entity.•"3 
The notion of concrescence does not fully explain 
the phenomena of brute fact such as a stone, a house, 
or Napoleon. Thus far the actual world consists of 
actual entities which are concrescences of prehensions. 
Actual entities are related to each other through the 
process of prehension, and the concrescence of prehensions 
form actual entities, and prehensions of concrescences 
t hus form a community of actual entities. This community 
of entities is a •nexus,• or a "public matter of fact."4 
A nexus is the result of the related togetherness of 
actual entities. This is the fourteenth Category of Ex-
planation, namely, "that a nexus is a set of actual enti-
tiel , in..: ·the unity of the relatedness constituted by their 
prehensions of each other.".5 The concrete data of ex-
perience are nexas6 of actual entities. "Each actual 
2. 
1. Also, at this point the actual entity perishes and 






PR, 32 • 
PR, 3.5. 
Whitehead uses the form "neXus" to indicate plurality 
"N tt • exuses, however, is in accordance with Webster's 
New International Dictionanz, 2nd ed. 
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world is a nexus"l and it forms another ultimate fact 
of existence. This is the third Category of Existence. 
The broad, general outline of Whitehead's scheme 
of thought is now apparent. The discussion thus far 
has not revealed all that Whitehead has to way about 
the universe, but it does give his general view of the 
world of nature. The universe must be conceived as a 
unity, but that unity is not conformity of substance 
or lack of substance. The unity of the universe is 
the process of the universe. The final realities are 
acts of experience which become concrete by becoming 
complete. The nature of experience is reciprocal action 
between data. 
At this point several questions justifiably arise 
which lead toward the more general substance of White-
head's thought. It may be asked, (i) how does an actual 
entity become what it is, and (ii) what is the origin 
of physical objects as we know them? These two ques-
tions may be predicated under a variety of forms, but 
for the purposes of this investigation the two questions 
will be subsumed under the more general issue of the 
becoming of characteristics in any particular thing, 
and the source of those characteristics, whatever they 
may be. 
1. PR, 351. 
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It was noted earlier that an actual entity is a 
concrescent process for which all other actual entities 
of the present actual world for it are the data; and, 
that in the becoming of the actual entity in question 
there is decision by it including some data and exclud-
ing the rest. Other actual entities enter into the 
description of the becoming actual entity. Even with 
this description of how a particular actual entity comes 
to be the way it is, it still remains a question of how 
the data of that actual entity came to be what they 
were. With the materials thus far presented, there 
is only the possibility of infinite regression. 
This is precisely the problem that in most meta-
physical systems has been most immanent in the order-
ing of the unity of the universe. Plato posited the 
doctrine of Ideas as a solution to the problem, and in 
more recent times the critical realists have formulated 
"essence." Whitehead also finds it necessary to posit 
a second order of being, but Plato's forms were too 
restricted, and 11dea' has subjective connotations in 
modern usage which would be misleading, and similarly 
is the case with 'essence.•l In search for a completely 
unambiguous term, Whitehead selects "eternal objects." 
Actual entities are the stuff of the actual or 
1. PR, 70. 
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temporal world. Any concept which is referential to 
the temporal world is necessarily referential to an 
actual entity or a nexus of actual entities; and, con-
versely, any conceptual recognition of an actual entity 
is referential to some part of the temporal world. In 
experience, however, there are conceptual recognitions 
of entities which do not refer to any actual entities. 
These entities are the eternal objects.l 
In the becoming of an actual entity, the 'given' 
in the process is the data of the concrescence. 'Given-
ness' is meaningless, however, apart from 'potential-
ity.• If this were not true, i.e., that 'givenness• 
is non-referential, then the cororescent process would 
result in nothing more th~ that with which it started, 
e.g., a static monistic universe. Thus, in every con-
crescent process, there is the potentiality for novelty. 
As to the source of this potentiality, Whitehead says, 
'givenness• and 'potentiality• are both 
meaningless apart from a multiplicity of 
potential entities. These potential-
ities are the •eternal objects.•2 
The primary function of an eternal object is in 
its relevance to any actual entity. Each eternal object 
has a definite effective relevance to some concrescent 
process. Eternal objects ex-press "how any one actual 
1. PR, ?o. This is the fifth Category of Existence. 
2. PR, 72. 
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entity is constituted by its synthesis of other actual 
entities."l It is at this point that the real distinc-
tion between actual entities and eternal objects arise. 
In the concrescent process, the objective data of the 
actual entity must be felt, for they are facts present 
in the temporal world. The importance of some of them 
may be negligent by virtue of negative prehensions, 
but they are nevertheless there. On the other hand, 
the eternal objects may be completely dismissed, for 
they are only pure potentials. "The one is stubborn 
matter of fact; and the other never loses its 'accent' 
of potentiality."2 
The character of eternal objects is thus twofold: 
they are pure potentials which when exemplified in the 
temporal world, constitute the definitness for any 
actual existence, and the manner of their existence 
is similar to the subsistence of Platonic forms.3 The 
twofold character of eternal objects once again sets 
forth the beginning problem of this discussion, i.e., 
the becoming of characteristics and the source of 
characteristics in the temporal world. The second 
1. PR, Bo.-
2. PR, 366. 
3. "Subsistence" for Whitehead means nothing more than 
"how eternal objects can be components of the pri-
mordial nature of God." PR, 73. A discussion of God 
is deferred from this investigation as it would only 
add to the confusion of a d~fficult subject. cr. 
PR, 519ff. 
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part of this question, the source of quality, is solved 
by Whitehead's positing the subsistence of eternal 
objects. 
The first part of the problem now takes the form 
of the community between eternal objects and actual en-
titles. Plato said that the world of sense, that is, 
the objects of sense, "participate" in the world of 
Forms or Ideas. Whitehead also uses the term 'parti-
cipation', but only parenthetically to the term of his 
origination, 'ingression.•l The order is also inverted 
in the Whiteheadian scheme: instead of the objects of 
sense particip*ting in the realm of forms, the eternal 
objects "ingress" into particular actual entities. 
Plato had trouble explaining what he meant by 'par-
ticipation,' and Whitehead has trouble making explicit 
what he means by "ingression" and how the fact is ac-
tually accomplished. 
In reference to the meaning of 'ingression,' it 
is nearly as clear now as it ever will be. Professor 
Emmet says that Whitehead uses the term 'ingression' 
for "the entry of a form into the constitution of an 
actuality, so that it becomes an 'ingredient' in it."2 
In Whitehead's own words: 
1. PR, 30, 63. 
2. WPO, 41. 
The things which are temporal arise by 
their participation in the things which 
are eternal ••• the actualities constitut-
ing the process of the world are con-
ceived as exemplifying the ingression 
(or 'participation'} of other things.l 
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and, "Only a selection of eternal objects are 'felt' 
by a given subject, and these eternal objects are then 
said to have 'ingression' in that subject. 11 2 The up-
shot of this is that there is in some sense a communi-
cation between the eternal and the temporal. 
\ihitehead further analyzes this relation into the 
internal relations of an actual entity. For example, 
change in an actual entity is only possible through 
eternal objects. "'Change' is the description of the 
adventures of eternal objects in the evolving universe 
of actual things. 11 3 But the changes which occur, occur 
in the actual entity, and not in the eternal objects. 
It is the "real essence" of the actual entity which 
is involved in the change, i.e., real objectifications 
of real data of the temporal world. The "abstract 
essence" of an actual entity is the permanent making 
possible the change. The abstract essence "is a com-
plex eternal object."4 
The completion of the concept of ingression is 
found in the correlation between ingression and con-
1. PR, 63. 
2. PR, 66, 
3. PR, 92. 
4. PR, 94. 
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crescence. It was noted earlier that concrescence is 
the coming together of many things to form a new actu-
ality.l Now it is clear what the "many things" are. 
In the concrescent process there are prehensions of 
temporal data, actual entities, and prehensions of 
eternal objects.2 \fuen an actual entity has been pre-
hended, it has been "objectifiedn; and, when an eternal 
object is positively prehended in the concrescent pro-
cess, it is said to have ingression into the actual 
entity. It is thus that Whitehead speaks of the pro-
cess of becoming as being dipolar: "{i) by reason of 
its Lactual entiti7 qualification by the determinate-
ness of the actual world, and (ii) by its conceptual 
prehensions of the indeterminateness of eternal ob-
~s."3 Ingression is thus a correlative process to 
the concrescent process. The actual entity is thus 
presented as having two poles from which its experienc-
ing is directed: the physical pole and the mental pole.4 
The preceding discussion reveals the seventh and 
twenty-fourth Categories of Explanation: 
(vii) That an eternal object can be 
described only in terms of its poten-
tiality for 'ingresslon 1 into the be-
1. cr. p. 31 . 
2. The specific content in both cases is eternal objects. 
For further discussion of the modes of ingression, 
see the chapter entitled "Abstraction" in SMW. 
3. PR, 72. Cf. below, Chapter III, section 3. 
4. PR, 366. 
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I 
coming of actual entities; and that 
its analysis only discloses other 
eternal objects. It is a pure poten-
tial. The term 1 in'gressi.on' refers to 
the particular mode in which the po-
tentiality of an eternal object is re-
alized in a particular entity, contri-
buting to the defi~iteness of that 
actual entity. I 
• • • • • • • • • • ! • • • • • • • • • 
(xxiv) The functioning of one actual 
entity in the self-:creation of another 
actual entity is the •objectification' 
of the former for the .latter actual 
entity. The functibning of an eternal 
object in the self-:creation of an 
actual entity is th,e 'ingression 1 of 
the eternal object ~n the actual entity.l 
I This completes the necessary discussion of the 
categories of Existence and the external relations 
between the different existents, with the exception of 
the Fourth and Fifth Categories of Existence, Subjec-
tive Forms and Propositions. The discussion of these 
categories is to be found ih chapter three, as they 
form an integral part of this investigation. The re-
, 
I 
maining Categories of Explanation and the 
I 
Categorial 
Obligations are noted I in chapter three in relation to 
the central motif of the chapter. 
Before leaving this exposition of the general 
metaphysical scheme of Whitehead as presented in Process 
and Reality to a detailed analysis of Whitehead's sub-
jectivist position, it would be well to summarize and 
comment on what has been said, and to point out its 
1. PR, 34, 38. 
particular relevance to what follows. 
An actual entity is the final ~~of the 
universe. An actual entity is not a stuff, but it is 
a process of self-formation. This process is a concre-
scence of data coming together to form a new entity, 
or occasion. The data are objectified by the entity 
in the concrescent process. The process leading to the 
objectification of data is the entity prehending the 
dAta. Prehensions are either positive or negative such 
that the entity either admits data to itself or rejects 
them from itself. Included in the data are objectified 
entities and eternal objects. The actual entities 
forming the data may be groups bound together temporally, 
i.e., nexus, or groups of entities bound together by a 
common characteristic which no entity outside of the 
group possesses.l Eternal objects are the pure po-
tentials or forms of definiteness for a new entity. 
One of the more significant things about the sum-
mary in the preceding paragraph, and, indeed, in all of 
Whitehead's philosophy, is that the 11final real things 
of which the world is made up"2 are subjects. In fact, 
Whitehead uses and describes the terms, "actual entity" 








of the Category of Exis-
Cf. also Categoreal Obligation (XVI). 
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to its environment, and its environment becomes "ob-
jectified." The subject is an experiencing subject, 
but it is a subject only in so far as it experiences. 
The subject as an entity is a process of experiencing, 
and its experiencing is its self-creation. "The feeler 
(subject) is the unity emergent from its own feelings,"l 
and "its 'being' is constituted by its 'becoming.'"2 
This indicates that there is not a primary subject or 
self which exists prior to the experiencing, or feeling.3 
A passage from Modes of Thought provides a perfect 
analogy to the subjectivism of an actual entity. 
I find myself as :.' essentially a unity 
of emotions, enjoyments, hopes, fears, 
regrets, valuations of alternatives, 
decision--all of them subjective re-
actions to the environment as active 
in my nature ••• The individual enjoy-
ment is what I am in my role of a 
natural activity, as I shape the ac-
tivities of the -environment into a new 
creation, which is myself at this mo-
ment; and yet, as being myself, it is 
a continuation of the antecedent world. 
If we stress the role of the environ-
ment, this process is causation. If 
we stress the role of my immediate 
pattern of active enjoyment, this pro-
cess is self-creation. If we stress 
the role of the conceptual anticipation 
of the future whose existence is a 
necessity in the nature of the present, 
1. PR, 136. 
2. PR, 34-35. 
3. This is contrary to the "substance" philosophies 
notably Kant•s. For them, the world is derived ' 
from the subject, but for the philosophy of organ-
ism as presented by Whitehead, the subject is de-
rived from the world. 
this process is the teleological aim at 
some ideal in the ruture.l 
43 
This is an analysis or the human self as an experiencing 
subject, but certain generalizations may be abstracted 
from this analysis which are applied by Whitehead to 
actual entities. In the first place, the subject is 
experiencing, running the gamut of experience from 
affectations to cognitions. Second, the subject is a 
unity of its activities. Third, the environment of 
the subject, the objective data, is active in the 
nature of the subject. Fourth, the subject is what it 
is b e cause of its subjective responses to the objective 
data. Fifth, the subject is eclectic in its reaction 
to the objective data according to a goal or aim. The 
rirst four of these generalizations have already been 
applied in this investigation; the fifth is applied by 
Whitehead to actual entities, and this shall be developed 
in the nex t chapter. 
-Upon reflection it would seem that there is much 
circularity and logical contradiction in the philosophy 
of organism. How is it that a subject can experience, 
and yet be nothing more than its own experiencing? 
Can a reeling feel without a reeler? Or, can the 
verb "feel" be the subject "feeler"? How is it that a 
subject can possess all the attributes commonly attributed 
1. MOT, 228. 
to consciousness, and yet not possess consciousness? 
Part of the answer to the latter question is found in 
Whitehead's unusual definition of consciousness which 
is discussed in section seven of the following chapter. 
The other questions are answered in ~arious stages of 
the following chapter, and a final consideration of the 
identity of the subject and its experience is made in 
the final chapter. Note, however, that these questions 
are based on the Aristotelian subject-predicate form 
of analysis. 
CHAPTER III 
ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPT OF SUBJECTIVITY 
1. Subjectivist Principle 
The history of philosophy has manifested three 
presuppositions which, according to Whitehead, are 
misconceptions of the nature of reality. All three 
were implicit to some extent in ancient Greek philosophy, 
but the explicit delineation of each came at different 
periods in the history of philosophy. 
(i) From Aristotle's formulation of logic--in 
particular his analysis of the syllogism into proposi-
tions and his analysis of propositions into subject and 
predicate--the substance-quality doctrine of reality 
came to be the fundamental presuppos ition upon which 
all metaphysical speculation rested. The doctrine em-
bodies the most natural way to speak of reality, for 
it follows the construct of language. For Aristotle 
and following philosophers, the primary substance of 
actuality is always a subject, and never a predicate. 
Whitehead denies this on two counts. First, the pri-
mary substance, actual entities, is both subject and 
predicate, or object. Actual entities are the subject 
of their own becoming, and the potential object of the 
becomi ng of future actual entities. Second, it followed 
rrom the subject-predicate form of propositions, that 
since the subject refers to the primary substance of 
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a particular, the predicate refers to some universal, 
i.e., quality. In the philosophy of organism, what are 
traditionally called particulars are actual entities; 
and what are traditionally called universals are eter-
nal objects. Neither actual entities nor eternal objects, 
however, can be described as either particulars or uni-
versals, or ~ versa. They both function as both 
universal and particular. An actual entity functions 
as a particular in its own subjectivity; it functions 
as a universal as it contributes to the becoming of 
other actual entities. An eternal object is universal 
in that it enters into the descriptions of many actual 
entities, but it is a particul~ for it is distinct 
from everything else.l 
(ii) From the assumption that actuality is par-
ticulars participating in universals, the answer to the 
question, how do we perceive things?, naturally was, 
through the senses. The explicit formulation of this 
sensationalist principle came through Locke and Hume. 
The perception of things is passive sensation, and 
nothing else. ~lhitehead formulates the sensationa-
list principle as, "The primary activity in the act 
1. cr. PR, 76ff. 
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of experience is the bare subjective entertainment of 
the· datum, devoid of any subjective form of reception."l 
The sensationalist principle is an interpretation of 
sensation in terms of the substance-quality doctrine. 
Whitehead's objections to this doctrine have already 
been noted. From the standpoint of perception, White-
h.e,ad . contends two things: first, that perception is 
not mere sensation, and, second, that perception is 
not passive in so far as the perceiver is not a vacuum 
preceding perceptual experience. 
The second objection just noted is a rejection of 
the doctrine of vacuous actuality implicit in the doc-
trines of Locke and Hume. The ''primary substance 11 of 
Aristotle and "windowless monads" of Leibniz are ex-
amples of vacuous actuality, i.e., devoid of any form 
prior to experience, until each had taken on universal 
forms to become particular existents. Kant recognized 
the ensuing problem of how emptiness becomes filled 
and formulated the subjectivist principle in an attempt 
to avoid the problem. 
(iii) The subjectivist principle as formulated 
by Kant may be put thus: the objective world is derived 
from constructions of subjective experience, and "the 
datum in the act of experience can be adequately anal-
1. PR, 239. 
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yzed purely in terms of universals."l The fundamental 
distinction between the sensationalist principle and 
the subjectivist principle is that the sensationalist 
principle describes the subjective enjoyment of exper-
iencing in terms of substance-quality propositions, 
while the subjectivist principle applies the substance-
quality categories to the external world as the ulti-
mate ontological principle, with emphasis on quality. 
Whitehead's objections to this form of the subjectivist 
principle are basically the same as his objections to 
the two preceding presuppositions of traditional phil-
osophy. The data of experience can not be described 
purely in terms of universals and primary substance, 
and primary substance is not a static, vacuous subject. 
Now that Whitehead has revised most of the whole 
of Western philosophy, one would wonder how he replaces 
its foundations. The whole of philosophy has not been 
erroneous, however. Whitehead accepts, with modifications, 
Descartes• dictum that subjects enjoying conscious ex-
periences are the primary data for philosophy. He ac-
cepts this premise for the philosophy of organism to 
such a d~gree that he claims Descartes' dictum to be 
"the greatest philosophical discovery since the age of 
Plato and Aristotle."2 This statement does not seem 
1. PR, 239. 
2. PR, 241. 
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strange in view of the fact that it was made by a man 
reared in the British empipicist tradition. The Car-
tesian principle is accepted by Locke and Berkeley, and 
it is sometimes argued that it is presupposed by Hume. 
Descartes reaffirmed the substance-quality doctrine, 
and it is probably for this reason that the subjec-
tivist principle as stated by him was in the subject-
predicate form. The elimination of the subject-pre-
dicate form from the statement of the subjectiv!st 
principle is the first modification noted in White-
head's reformation.l The second modification by White-
head is the restriction of consciousness as a modifier 
in the statement.2 This elimination broadens the scope 
of the subjectivist principle in application as the 
primary metaphysical principle. The "reformed subjec-
tivist principle" thus reads in Whitehead, "subjective 
experiencing is the primar> y metaphysical situation 
which is presented to metaphysics for analysis."3 
This formulation of the subjectivist principle 
has two effects. First, through the elimination of 
consciousness from the concept of subjectivity, the 
external world and the fundamental nature of things 
ceases to be merely an object of the philosophically 
1. The modification eliminates the soul substance pre-
dicament of Descartes and Locke. 
2. cr. below, section 7. 
3. PR, 243. 
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speculating human mind. There is as much process, as 
much experiencing in the physical world, though of a 
lower order, as there is in the developed self-hood of 
the human mind. Every actual entity of the universe 
is experiencing, or better, it is experiences. Second, 
there is an elimination of both subject-predicate forms 
of thought and strict subject-object forms of activity. 
It is in respect to the latter that Whitehead says, 
"The reformed subjectivist principle adopted by the 
philosophy of organism is merely an alternative state-
ment of the principle of relativity (the fourth Category 
of E~planation)."l It is the nature of being to be a 
potential for becoming. It is the nature of every sub-
ject to be a potential object. Every actual entity is 
experiencing, and once it has reached completion,2 it 
becomes the object of feeling in future concrescent 
processes. 
It is evident in the forgoing discussion that there 
is a dichotomy between Whitehead's meaning of the sub-
jectivist principle and his use of the subjectivist 
principle. Everything is experiencing, for there is 
no subject prior to the experiencing, or feeling, as 
noted previously; "subjective experiencing" is the 
1. PR, 252. 
2. For the completion of an actual entity in the pro-
cess of concrescence, see below the section entitled, 
"Feeling." 
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primary data. Thus it is that Whitehead says, 11 Nothing 
is to be received into the philosophical scheme which 
is not discoverable as an element in subjective ex-
perience,nl and, 11 apart from the experiences of sub-
jects there is nothing, nothing, nothing, bare nothing-
ness."2 On the other hand, Whitehead continually writes 
of actual entities prehending and feeling other entities 
as if there were a subject doing the prehending and 
feeling. In the two above quotations the dichotomy 
is most explicit. Two other quotations in Whitehead 
will aid in pointing out these two modes of thought: 
"the word 'subject' means the entity constituted by 
the process of' f'eeling, and including this process,"3 
and, "an actual entity is to be conceived ••• as a subject 
presiding over its own immediacy of' becoming."4 Thus 
it is that Whitehead speaks of a subject as activity, 
and as acting. 
Is this contradiction the result of the impossibil-
ity of' the thought, or the impossibility of language? 
It would be quite temerous to answer affirmatively to 
the f'irst unless one had the competency in mathematics 
and physics that Whitehead had. A negative answer is 
more easily achieved, for it is possible to think of 
activity, regardless of what form that activity may 
1. PR, 253. 
2. PR, 254. 
3. PR, 136. 
4. PR, 71. 
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take. It becomes extremely difficult, however, to speak 
of that activity in a complete delineation of meta-
physical thought without abstracting it such that it 
comes to perform the role ot: "subject" in a predicative 
sentence. The answer to the second question appears, 
therefore, to be affirmative; it is impossible to use 
language in its present form without using a tithing-
subject." 
The problem remains, however, whether Whitehead's 
delineation ot: the components of subjectivity meet the 
requirements of his reformed subjectivist principle. 
In the above discussion there has not been a thorough 
analysis of the relation Whitehead posits between the 
subject and its experiencing, or feeling. It is pos-
sible that the contradiction between his meaning of 
"subject" and his use of "subject" is only apparent and 
not real. Whitehead holds that there are two essential 
relations existing between the subject and its feeling. 
The first relation is that the subject is the final 
goal which is felt and toward which the reeling is di-
rected.l "The feelings are inseparable from the end 
at which they aim; and this end is th~ feeler."2 The 
second relation is that the subject is the "unity emer-
gent from its own feelings.") There are thus two meanings 
1. This end is what Whitehead terms a "subjective aim." 
A fuller discussion of it may be found below. 
2. PR, 339. 
). PR, 136. 
of' the term 11 subject 11 in the philosophy o:f organism. 
Is it possible that these two meanings can be united 
and are united in Whitehead? 
Upon close examination it is :found that the two 
relations delineated are explanatory of e3ch other. 
The "subjective aimtt is the goal or end toward which 
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the concrescent process o:f :feeling strives, thus pro-
viding unity of' end to the many diverse :feelings. Once 
the subjective aim is achieved, there is the :final unity, 
or 11 satis:faction," of' the completed concrescent process. 
Therefore, when Whitehead speaks of the subject of an 
actual entity, he is referring to the totality of "feel-
ings-aim-satisfaction." Thus, both relations are ac-
tually 11 end11 ~oncepts. 
It now becomes necessary to inquire into the meaning 
of' "subjective aim" and "satis.faction. 11 What is the 
real nature of' the subjective aim, and what is its 
.function in the concrescent process? Once the aim is 
achieved, what is the nature of the satisfaction, and 
what is the nature of the satisfied entity? 
In summary, the significance of' the reformed sub-
jectivist principle is that it results in a reversal 
o.f Kant's dictum that the objective world arises from 
the subject; the subject is the result o.f the novel 
:feeling of many data coming together to form a new 
entity. 
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2. Subjective Aim 
In the last section it was indicated that every 
actual entity strives toward some goal in its becoming, 
and that the goal is in some way immanent within the 
actual entity. The problem set forth for this section 
is to discover exactly what Whitehead means by "sub-
jective aim." A discussion of the problem is necessary 
if there is to be an adequate analysis of Whitehead's 
concept of subjectivity. The difficulty of the pro-
blem is intensified by Whitehead's scanty explanation 
of the term, and his profuse use of it. 
The subjective aim is the unifying factor in the 
concrescence of an actual entity; "concrescence moves 
toward its final cause, which is its subjective aim."l 
In all of Whitehead's linguistic adaptations from other 
philosophers, it is at this point that Whitehead adopts 
the language of Aristotle; but while for Aristotle the 
final or telic cause was a vague, ill-defined desire 
for something either objective or subjective, the final 
cause of an actual entity for Whitehead is always a 
subjective enticement for self completion. In respect 
to the adaptation of the language of Aristotle and to 
the function of the subjective aim in the concrescence, 
it is found that 
1. PR, 320. 
the 'objectifications' of the actual 
entities in the actual world relative 
to a definite actual entity, constitute 
the efficient causes out of which that 
actual entity arises; the •subjective 
aim' at 'satisfaction' constitutes the 
final cause, or lure, whereby there is 
determinate concrescence.l 
It is necessary that there be teleological functions 
in the concrescent process in order to avoid both 
chaos and inflexible mechanism. In the latter, each 
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actual entity would reproduce exactly what had gone 
before it. In the former, there would be no unity in 
the concrescent process; and, therefore, the concrescent 
process would no longer be concrescent, but only a 
disorganized, unintelligible process. 
Hence, the first three Categorial Obligations.2 
(i) The Category of Subjective Unity. 
The many feelings which belong to an 
incomplete phase in the process of an 
actual entity, though unintegrated by 
reason of the incompleteness of the 
phase, are compatible for integration 
by, reason of the unity of their sub-
ject. 
This category is the basic postulate of the subjective 
aim. The concrescent process begins with the entire 
actual world of actual entities as the data for feeling. 
These data must be either positively or negatively pre-
hended. The subjective aim is the valuational factor 
according to which the unity of the concrescent process 
1. PR, 134. 
2. PR, 39. 
is achieved through the positive prehensions. 
(ii) The Category of Objective Identity. 
There can be no duplication of any ele-
ment in the objective datum of the 'sa-
tisfaction' of an actual entity, so 
far as concerns the function of that 
element in the •satisfaction.' 
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This category establishes the novelty of each subjective 
aim in each actual entity. Although the actual entity 
in the creative process feels the data, it abstracts 
elements from each datum by virtue of the subjective 
aim so that no objective datum is duplicated completely 
in the concrescent process. 
(iii) The Category of Objective Diversity. 
There can be no •coalescence' of di-
verse elements in the objective datum 
of an actual entity, so far as concerns 
the functions of those elements in that 
satisfaction. 
This category is a continuation of the preceding eate-
gory. It establishes the primacy of the subjective 
aim in its function of selecting data for final sat-
isfaction, such that there is no duplicating · selection 
of mutually exclusive elements which would serve identi-
cal functions toward the satisfaction of the concrescent 
process. 
This rather complicated discussion of these three 
categories is not as difficult as it might seem. The 
first category establishes unity to an actual entity 
through teleological function. The second and third 
categories set forth the foundations or limitations 
on the functioning of the subjective aim. The sub-
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jective aim may not reproduce exactly any element in the 
objective datum, and it may not duplicate functions of 
diverse elements. 
The subjective aim thus appears to be a valuational 
function which establishes the unity and direction of 
the concrescent process according to its own value 
character. The question now arises as to the nature 
of the subjective aim aside from its function of uni-
fying. In other. words, what is the value inherent in 
the subjective aim? 
The general value, or subjective aim, of all ac-
tual entities is the achievement of self satisfaction 
for objective data for future actual entities. In 
the concrescent process, the actual entity 
is guided by its ideal of itself as 
individual satisfaction and as trans-
cendent creator. The enjoyment of this 
ideal is the •subj ective aim.'l 
In this passage there are twG notions which must be 
considered: the actua l entity as satisfied, and the 
actual entity as a "transcendent creator." It is suf-
ficient to way that satisfaction is the end, or final 
stage, of the concrescent process. The process ceases 
1. PR, 130. 
when the process emerges into a "concrete unity of 
f'eeling."l This is to say that the notion of' satis-
f'aetion is the dif'f'erentiation between the "entity as 
concrete" and the "process of' concrescence."2 
At the completion of' the concrescent process, 
the actual entity ceases to be an entity of' the pre-
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sent, and it becomes an entity of the past. As m1 
entity of the past, it is a potential datum for future 
actual entities, and a real datum for present concres-
cent processes. It is in this sense that part of the 
subjective aim is as a "transcendent creator." 
The four questions forwarded at the conclusion of 
the last section have now bee~ answered from the stand-
point of' Whitehead's philosophy of organism. The sub-
jective aim is an ideal at self realization wh ich func-
tions as the unif'ying principle of the concrescent 
process. Satisfaction is the achievement of concrete 
unity according to the subjective aim, and the self'-
realized, i.e., satisfied, entity is a datum f'or com-
mencing actual occasions. 
It f'alls vli thin the purview of the investigation 
to inquire into the nature of the relationship between 
the concrescent process and the data for that process. 
1 . PR, 322. 
2. PR, ' 129. 
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The inquiry shall be guided by the general problem or 
the nature or the prehension process, and more speci-
rically it shall be guided by such questions as how the 
process is achieved and how novelty is attained. 
3. Prehension 
The notion of prehension is dirricult to discuss 
withou t an analysis or the notion or reeling. In 
general, the two may be said to be synonymous, but 
where feeling is used, it is intended to refer to some 
speciric type of feeling as opposed to a general term 
to cover all types of feeling . This latter use for 
generality is reserved ror the term 'prehension.' This 
is not explicit in Whitehead, but it is implicit in his 
use of the terms, for often when he uses the term 'pre-
hension' the context of the use is rar removed rrom 
what he means by feeling. Thus, where •reeling' may 
be said to be the name or a class of acta of similar 
order, 'prehension' may be said to be a class of acts 
which includes the class 'feeling' as one of its mem-
bers. 
This indicate s that there is another distinction 
between prehension and feeling aside from the one just 
noted. In the preceding chapter it was said that in 
general there are two kinds of prehensions, positive 
and negative, and that positive prehensions are the 
inclusion of data into the becoming subject while ne-
gative prehensions are the definite exclusion of data 
from the subject. This distinction previously made 
is the key to the difference between feeling and pre-
hension, for it is only when data are included, or 
admitted, that there is feeling. In other words, 
positive prehension and feeling are referent to the 
same fact. Whether or not they are synonymous terms 
60 
is a question for later discussion, but for the present 
the concern is the general notion of prehension. The 
distinction is sufficient for present purposes. 
The discussion of prehensions falls naturally into 
the scheme of this investigation of moving from general-
ity to particularity. From a general discussion in 
chapter two of Whitehead's categorial scheme the general 
notion of hhe subject was evolved. In the first section 
of this chapter the concept of subjectivity was faced 
directly, but only in the broadest terms of generality. 
The generality of the treatment of the concept of sub-
jectivity in that section raised questions which could 
be answered only through an analysis of the individual 
subject. Thus followed the section on subjective aim. 
Through this analysis the distinctive characteristic 
of the subject was located, namely, the urge toward 
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self realization or satisfaction. But the question 
remained, how does the subject accomplish this? In 
other words, by what process does the subject become? 
An answer has been given to this question in chapter 
two, but it must be admitted that so far the answer is 
insufficient. For nothing more has been done than to 
name the process as a concrescence of prehensions. 
But what is prehension? 
Indeed, the notion is a nebulous one, and perhaps 
justifiably so. Prehension is a relation, but White-
head's notion of prehension does not stop with relation, 
for relation suggests static morphology, and prehension 
is a process relation. This much was noted in the 
previous chapter, and little more can be said about 
prehension in general. The task now is to consider 
particular prehension and see if by doing so something 
more can be discovered about this nebulous notion. 
In the previous chapter it was stated that there 
are two species of prehension, positive and negative. 
Al t .hough the bulk of this section shall be devoted to 
positive prehensions, negative prehensions are not to 
be considered as either unimportant or ineffective. 
Whitehead is careful to emphasize the importance of 
negative prehensions. A negative prehension is essen-
tially the rejection of fact, or the elimination of 
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potentiality. In this instance potentiality is not 
intended to mean the same as that in relation to eternal 
objects. For example, the North American continent 
is what it is because it was not dominated by Spain.l 
This may seem to be nothing more than the tautology 
that if things were differnet, then they would be 
different. The implications of negative prehensions 
and the given ·example are far more than this simple 
tautology, however. The fact is that first Spain and 
then France almost did dominate the North American 
continent, and the significance of this fact is that 
a potential did not actualize. Implicit in the doc-
trine of negative prehension is the whole problem of 
contra-factual conditionals. It might be said that 
every instance of a negative prehension is an instance 
of actual subjunctive. Whitehead does not explicitly 
say this, but it seems highly possible he would approve 
the statement. Once negative prehensions are consider-
ed in this perspect ive, a multitude of new questions 
arise. The limits of this investigation do not allow 
further inquiry, but the problems seem well worth an 
investigation. 
Whitehead argues further that negative prehensions 
make a definite contribution to newly arising actual 
1. MT, 122. 
occasions even though the in tial data are rejected, 
for the subjective form of t~e negative prehension 
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becomes a part of the actual occasion. The notion of 
subjective form is more full considered in section 
four but for the present, it may be considered as the 
internal constitution or the fundamental mode of pre-
hension. That is, the subje , tive form is how a subject 
prehends a datum. Thus it i that the mere fact of 
rejection produces or affect the rejector in much 
the same way that decisions n the conscious level 
set an attitude for future d cision events, but where 
consciousness is not a facto ; the same effect is achieved 
through the Category of Subj ctive Unity. 
It may be asked why the e is rejection of data 
in the concrescent process. To answer this question 
there must be a reference ba k to what was said in the 
two preceding sections. The e it was noted (i) that 
in part by the Category of 0 jective Identity and (iii) 
in part by the Category of S bjective Diversity. These 
three factors place certain ; imitations on the con-
crescence, and in order that the limitations apply, 
there must be a rejection of that which is outside the 
limitations. This is not the complete answer to the 
question as given by Whitehe d, but it is sufficient. 
The significance of both the question and the answer 
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is to point up the internal nity of Whitehead's scheme, 
and that the primary concern of the scheme is the 
growing or becoming of unifi d subjects, i.e., actual 
entities. 
A more difficult questi n which a pplies equally 
as well to positive prehensi ns is how there is either 
rejection or admission Certainly the North 
American continent did not c oose not to be dominated 
by Spain. This question ste s from two misunderstand-
ings, and it leads to a para ox that can only be con-
sidered in section seven of his chapter. 11 Choose 11 
connotes cognition, and the bjection stems partly from 
the just consideration that he North American continent 
is not cognizant. Thus, the paradox, for while the 
North American continent is ot conscious in the usual 
sense, it nevertheless react to data both affirmatively 
and neg atively as a subject n the process of becoming. 
This entails a necessity for a redefinition of conscious-
ness which is forthcoming in section seven. The s e cond 
~sunderstanding is that the North American continent 
was not the subject in the e ergent fact that it is 
not dominated by Spain. Rat er, the subject was ''the-
North-American-continent-non dominated," for this was 
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the actual entity, or more c · rrectly the nexus, coming 
to be. The question, now appears to ,be the crux 
of the whole investigation i to subjectivism, for the 
"how" is answered by the sub ~ ect itself. 
The main significance o negative prehensions is 
found in the total scheme of Whitehead's subjectiv-
ism. By the ontolog ical pri .ciple, everything must be 
related. The notion of preh nsion is the bond of re-
latedness 
related to everything 
universe which is the 
But if everything is 
the same way, then the 
of discourse is static. 
Furthermore, if the relation is positive in so far as 
the relation is universal a ission, then ord~r escapes 
and chaos ensues. To restor order, or to maintain 
order, there must be a plura ity in kinds of relations 
just as there is a plurality of objects. In addition, 
the relatedness must not be ne of uniform admission, 
i.e., the prehensions cannot all be positive, for then 
every actual entity would be positively related to 
every other entity. This wo infinite degrees 
of complexity, and further a low mutual ly exclusive or 
incompatible factors in the rehensions of a single 
subject. Neg ative prehensio s are necessary, for they 
preserve the unity of the su ject and the order of the 
concrescent process through implification by the 
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elimination o~ incompatible ata. 
Thus negative prehensio ~ s are important ~rom at 
least three standpoints: (i) neg ative prehensions in 
conjunction with the subject ve aim maintain the unity 
o~ the subject; (ii) in the arne manner, neg ative pre-
hensions provide order to th concrescent process; and 
(iii) negative prehensions v a their subjective forms 
contribute as positive ~acts of rejection to the in-
ternal constitution of the a tual erttity.l 
It must be remembered t at a prehension is a part 
o~ the prehendi ng actual ent ty in that it is one o~ 
~he phases o~ the concrescen e. In a sense, then, a 
prehension is a subject, or phase o~ a subject, in 
so ~ar as the prehension is I nseparable ~rom the subject. 
In speaking o~ subjects and l rehensions, they are spoken 
o~ as separable and separate , but this is abstrac-
tion due to the convenience ~ ~language, and not a true 
report o~ the actual state o a~~airs. A prehension 
is the means whereby data ar admitted to or rejected 
~rom the newly ~arming entit • As such, a prehension 
~rep~educes in itsel~ the ge eral characteristics or 
an actual entity ••• any chara teristic or an actual 
1. Whitehead lists six ~act~rs l eading to the impor-
tance or negative p r ehen ions in PR, 66. However, 
~i), (ii) and (iii) ~ ai'e ~ 
1
edundant; (iv) is identical 
o the above (iii); (v) is a subject ~or discussion 
in the next section; and {vi) is a ~actor which is 
important not exclusivel to negative prehensions. 
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entity is reproduced in apr hension ... ~ 
Thus it is that data ar made avail.able through 
prehension. Whether the dat are admitted or rejected 
determines the nature of the prehension, i.e., posi-
tive or negative. Prehensio is thus analyzable into 
two phasest2 (i) the conside data, and (ii) 
the inclusion or rejection o data. A positive pre-
hension is one in which data are included in the new 
actual entity. This process is generally called 1feel-
ing.'3 This is the distinct on between prehension and 
feeling alluded to earlier i this section. That is, 
the class of prehensions has as one of its members 
positive prehensions or the lass of feelings. At a 
first reading of Whitehead i appears that the terms 
'feeling' and 'positive preh nsion' are equivalent 
in being different names of thing, but further 
examination reveals that thi is not the case. The 
distinction between positive prehensions and feelings 
is fully developed in the fi section, but a single 
statement is necessary to av possible confusion in 
the ensuing remarks. A posi ive prehension is the ad-
mission of data, and the fee ing of that data occurs 
during the admission and is orrelative to the admit-
ting process; after the posi ive prehensions have been 
1. PR, 2B-29. ' • PR, 34-35. 
2. PR, 82. 
completed, the actual entity is also complete, i.e., 
satisf ied, and the actual en ity ceases to prehend, 
but is prehended, and it cea es to feel new data and 
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is not only felt, but is a ' ity of feelings.! Now that 
this distinction is made it s possible to continue 
with the analysis of prehens ons. 
Positive prehensions va y in type according to the 
type of data that are ed. On the primitive 
are t wo types of data to be rehended: actual entities 
and eternal objects.2 only natural that the 
process of appropriating dif erent types or kinds of 
objects be different in resp ct to the object s . Actual 
are pure potentials. It cou d hardly be expected, then, 
that the positive prehension of a past actual entity 
by a contemporary actual ent ty be identical in every 
respect to the positive preh nsion by the same actual 
entity of an eternal object. Though the positive pre-
hension of an eternal object and the positive prehen-
sion of an actual entity are not ident ical, they are 
similar in that they are bot positive prehensions. 
For distinguishing terms for the two types of positive 
prehensions, Whitehead uses physical prehens ion' to 
1. PR, 82. 
2. PR, 335. 
* -·· 
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denote positive prehensions f actual entities and 
'conceptual prehensions' to enote positive prehensions 
of eternal objects. 1 
In all the discussion us far it has been said 
that a positive prehension the admission or inclusion 
of data into the new entity. This has been fully ac-
curate, but not quite comple e, for the whole of any 
particular datum is not incl ded as a whole. There is 
always some elimination. s is most clear in con-
nection with physical prehen ions. The process of a 
physical prehension is not a exact nor even :~omplete 
transfer of components from he objectified actual entity 
to the new one. 
ferred, and then there is ne er complete identity. 
This is true from two standpoints. First, each new 
actual entity is new with its own subjective aim and 
its own subjective forms. is fact alone involves 
data. The data, by being p aced in a new subjective 
I . 
context, are transformed. ~econd, there is always 
1. The term 'physical' is ~o be understood in the same 
terms or context in which concreteness was expounded 
in the previous chapter. It is further used to 
denote that the primary data involved in this type 
of prehension are component s of actual entities, 
the concrete matters of the universe, as distinct 
from non-concrete entities such as eternal objects. 
The term 'conceptual' is used for the same purpose, 
but it has further connotations which will be 
enumerated later. 
elimination of some components in the initial data. 
As Whitehead expresses it, "There are factors in the 
environment which are eliminated from any function as 
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explicit facts in the new creation. The running stream 
purifies itself. ttl Thus it is that the inclusion of 
of data is never in toto, but only in part. "The crude 
notion that one actual entity is added to another 
simpliciter ••• is not what is meant."2 
A physical prehension is thus a prehension of an 
objectively immortal actual entity. It has been noted 
previously that the content of an actual entity is com-
plex, being composed of both concrete content and re-
alized potential content, i.e., ingressed eternal ob-
jects. A physical prehension is the prehension of the 
concrete content of an actual entity. The presence of 
conceptual feelings in the prehended entity gives rise 
to a new order of physical prehension in the prehend-
ing entity. In this prehension, termed 'hybrid,' there 
is the transfer of the physically felt conceptual con-
tent. This hybrid p~ehension is nevertheless a phy-
sical prehension for it is a prehension of an actual 
entity. The notion of hybrid physical prehension pro-
vides no more difficulty than the simple or pure phy-
sical prehension. It is merely the added notion which 
1. AI, 255. 
2. PR, 80. 
makes possible direct prehension of non-contiguous 
actual entities.l 
The notion of c onceptual prehensions presents 
slightly more difficulty than physical prehensions. 
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It is made simpler, however, if it is remembered that 
a conceptual prehension is closely bound to the notion 
of ingression. The data for conceptual prehensions 
are eternal objects. Ingression is the realization 
of an eternal object in the actual entity, and con-
ceptual prehension is the retention of an eternal 
object in the actual entity.2 The most difficulty is 
encountered with the term •conceptual.• It has been 
noted that one purpose of the term is to differenti-
ate prehensions according to the data prehended. Since 
an eternal object is a potential entity and not an ac-
tual entity, it could not be physically prehended as 
concrete entities are. But what are the implications 
of t h e term •conceptual'? Whitehead does not mean 
conscious apprehension, nor any sort of conscious ac-
tivity even under his conception of consciousness. 
What, then, does he mean? 
Whitehead states that "the technical term •concep-
tual prehension• is entirely neutral, devoid of all 
suggestiveness."3 He connot mean this literally, 
1 . PR, 469. 2. PR, &2 . 3. PR, 49. 
'.: 
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however, for if such were the case, the term would 
also be devoid of meaning. Indeed, he goes on to cor-
relate the meaning of the term with other concepts, 
such as appetition and Bergson's intuition. But the 
final pseudo-equivalent terms upon which he rests are 
'vision' and 'envisagement.' "A conceptual prehension 
is a direct vision of some possibility."l These terms 
do not eliminate the difficulty originally found with 
•conceptual.' The most that can be said directly on 
the basis of Whitehead is that the term 'conceptual' 
is to suggest {i) non-concrete, (ii) not conscious, 
but (iii) the rudiments of mentality.2 
Conceptual prehensions arise from the mental pole 
of the actual entity, just as physical prehensions 
arise from the physical pole.3 And as physical pre-
hensions were of two kinds, simple and hybrid, so con-
ceptual prehensions are either pure or impure. Thus 
far the discussion has been centered around conceptual 
prehensions as a whole, but with reference mainly to 
pure conceptual prehensions. The distinction between 
pure and impure conceptual prehensions is on the same 
basis as the distinction between simple and hybrid 
1. PR, 5o. 
2. PR, 49. 
3. Note als.o the relation between physical and con-
ceptual feelings in the Category of Conceptual 
Valuation. See also below, section 5. 
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physical prehensions, i.e., the type of data prehended. 
The data of a pure conceptual prehension are eternal 
objects. The data of impure conc eptual prehensions 
are propositions.l Propositions are the sixth Category 
of Existence, and they are also termed theories.2 
A proposition has as its subject an actual entity or 
group of actual entities and as its predicate one or 
more etern4l objects. It is significant to note at 
this point that although Whitehead disapproves of the 
Aristotelian subject-predicate form as noted earlier, 
he nevertheless posits a category of existence of the 
subject-predicate form. Why he does this and the sig-
nificance it has for his subjectivism is the subject 
of inquiry for section six of this chapter. 
The relation that exists between conceptual pre-
hensions and physical prehensions is not altogether 
clear in Whitehead, and as a result some writers about 
him have tended to be confused in their discussions of 
prehensions without realizing their confusion. ~lhite-
head is apparently contradictory, but this is a result 
of his sometimes relaxed fluidity in the use of terms. 
The confusion stems mostly around the terms 'prehension' 
and 'feeling.' Whitehead appears to use them synonymously, 
1. PR, 280. 
2. PR, 33. 
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and frequently critics have freely used them as such. 
There is a distinction between the two as was observed 
earlier. Whitehead does say that ttpositive prehensions 
are termed 'feelings,rtt but he goes on to use the term 
'feeling' as both a phase of a process and a coincident 
of process.l For example, "Thus a component feeling 
in the satisfaction is to be assigned, for its origina-
tion, to an earlier phase of the concrescence.n2 Fail-
ing to realize this distinction, A. H. Johnson states 
that nall conceptual prehensions are derived from phy-
sical feelings."3 As reference Johnson cites page 378 
of Process and Reality. What Whitehead writes on that 
page, however, is that "conceptual feelings are primarily 
derivate LSi£7 from physical feelings." Such a mis-
quotation makes considerable differ.e.nce in Johnson 1 s 
discussion of the relation between physical and con-
ceptual prehensions. Further, if Johnson's interpreta-
tion of Whitehead is correct, then Whitehead is actually 
rather than apparently contradictory. Only through 
a fiat could the above statement by Whitehead be made 
compatible with the position that the datum of a pure 
conc~ptual prehension is an eternal object if 1 feeling 1 
and 'prehension' are strictly synonymous. 
The relation between the t1.vo kinds of positive 
1. PR"; 337. 
2. PR, 337. 
3. WTR, 25. 
75 
prehensions is primarily through feelings, other than 
the natural relationship of belonging to the same actual 
entity. This relation, as partly shown in the pre-
ceding paragraph, is more fully delineated in the fifth 
section. Basically, however, the relation rests upon 
the fact that conceptual feelings can arise out of 
physical feelings resulting from hybrid physical pre-
hensions. Thus, while the conceptual prehension is of 
an eternal object, conceptual feelings are referent 
to ingressed eternal objects, or exemplifications of 
eternal objects as prehended from the physical pole of 
the actual entity. It seems necessary to summarily 
point this out, even though more complete consideration 
follows, in order to c omplete the notion of prehension. 
The analysis of prehensions has yielded some 
knowledge of what the notion of prehension involves. 
For one thing, prehension is activity, and, while the 
subject is built up primarily out of its past, this 
building up is not passive. There is the basic process 
of the universe exhibited in the active subject prehend-
ing its past, and such prehension involves all aspects 
of activity from the barest physical operations to the 
barest emotive and mental operations. Prehension is 
further the process whereby novelty is introduced in 
the universe in newly arising entities. Prehensions 
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are not responsible ror novelty, but they are the means 
whereby novelty is achieved. The ractors responsible 
ror novelty are the subjective aim and the subjective 
rorm.l Berore proceeding to an analysis or reeling, 
it is well to tarry brierly with an inquiry into sub-
jective form. 
4. Subjective Form 
The rluidity of Whitehead's terms appears again 
in his use or 'subjective rorm. t 2 In discussing sub-
jective form, it seems that Whitehead often has two 
meanings in mind. More commonly he means attitude or 
emotional reaction. That is, the subjective form is 
the attitude or emotional tone in the prehension. 
This is in conformity with the thirteenth Category of 
Explanation.3 On the other hand, Whitehead seems to 
be referring to the whole inner life of the actual en-
tity. For example, 11the subjective forms of feelings 
are only explicable by the categoreal demands arising 
from the unity ~f the subject."4 The second meaning 
is not common, and it is highly probable that it is 
not what Whitehead meant, for in the same context he 
says the "private side [Of a prehensi£!!7 is constituted 
by the subjective form."5 This indicates that in the 
1. PR, 354. 
2. This is Category of Existence IV,PR, 32. 
3. PR, 35. 
4. PR, 447. Cf. AI, 227, 325. 
5. PR, 444. 
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previous note, Whitehead was not talking about the 
whole actual entity, but merely about the whole of the 
feelings arising from the whole of the prehensions 
in any actual entity. It is comparatively certain, then 
that the first meaning is the one for all final inter-
pretation. 
It was noted that subjective form is one of the 
factors contributing to novelty in the newly arising 
actual entity. This fact points to one of the most 
essential attributes or descriptive characteristics 
o:f the subjective form. 11The subjective form is the 
immediate novelty; it is how ~ subject is feeling 
that objective datum."l The subjective form is in-
separable from the novelty of the concrescence. Each 
subject is novel mainly by its own subjective attitude 
toward all objectified data. The subjective form, then, 
constitutes the functioning subjective perspective; the 
subjective aim constitutes the valuational perspective 
directing the concrescence. This is not to say, of 
course, that the subjective form is entirely original 
without any aharacteristics which are not novel. The 
subjective form as a whole cannot be separated from 
objective data, for the subjective form "always involves 
reproduction of the pattern of objective datum.n2 
1. PR, 354. 
2. PR, 357. 
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The subjective form is analyzable into two factors, 
the 'qualitative pattern' and the 'pattern of intensive 
quantity.' 1 The two are interrelated such that they 
cannot be separated, for in the qualitative pattern 
there are intensities, and in the intensities there 
are qualitative patterns. As an example of this, 
Whitehead cites a single musical tone. The tone has 
the qualitative patterns of the basic tone and the 
overtones; and both the basic tone and the overtones 
each have their own relative intensities. The signi-
ficance of the dual analysis of subjective form is found 
in the admission of both intensity and quality into 
the concrescing subject from a satisfied datum. 
From what has been said thus far it would seem 
that the subjective form is merely an ingressed eter-
nal object. This is partially true. If the subjective 
form is emotive, or valuational, as in the case of con-
ceptual prehensions,2 and emotional tones are eternal 
objects, then the subjective form must be an eternal 
object. Whitehead affirms this in that in subjective 
form is found the basis of the notion of ingression. 
He says, "The fundamental example of the notion 'quality 
inhering is LSic, iri7 particular substance' is afforded 
by 'subjective form inhering in feeling.'"3 But the 
1. PR, 3S6f. 
2. PR, 367. 
3. PR, 354. 
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distinguishing £actor o£ the subjective £orm £rom the 
ingressed eternal obj ect is that the subjective £orm 
is a _, mode or pattern o£ an active process relation. 
That is, the subjective £orm is a part o£ the prehen-
sion, and the prehension is a £actor in the subjective 
£orm. Whitehead goes on to say, ttl£ we ab s tract the 
form £rom the ·£eeling, we are le£t with an eternal 
object as the remnant o£ subjective £orm."l 
Realizing that subjective £orms are emotional and 
qualitative, and that they constitute one o£ the most 
important £actors in the becoming o£ actual entities 
in that they are how an entity prehends a datum, a 
clearer understanding o£ Whitehead's statement that 
"the primitive form o£ physical experience is emotion--
blind emotion--received as £elt elsewhere in another 
occasion and conformally appropriated as a subjective 
passionu is achieved.2 This statement calls £or a 
critical inquiry into what Whitehead cons iders as emotion, 
but £or the present it may be understood in the usual 
terms o£ af£ectation. This statement g ives further 
insight into what particular subjective forms are for 
particular types of prehensions and feelings. For ex-
ample, the subjective £orms o£ physical £eelings are 
emotive; for propositional feelings they are valuational. 
1. PR, 354. 
2. PR, 246. 
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These, and others, shall be defined more clearly in 
section five where the notion of feeling is analyzed. 
The subjective form is significant from at least 
three standpoints. (i) It is the subject via its sub-
jective form that introduces novelty into the universe. 
(ii) The subjective form is the basis for the emergent 
qualities such as consciousness and mind. And (iii), 
by (i) and (ii), · the subject never starts as a vacuous 
actuality. 
5. Feeling 
In beginning the analysis of feeling in Whitehead's 
philosophy, it is necessary once again to consider the 
supposed distinction between feeling and prehension. 
As noted earlier, Whitehead does not make explicit any 
distinction. In fact, he explicitly states that po-
sitive prehensions are termed feelings. The ques t ion 
immediately arises, then, why does Whitehead use both 
terms so frequently if they are synonymous? Why not 
use just one? Clarity cannot be the answer, for cer-
tainly it is much less confusing to use one term con-
sistently than to use two terms indiscriminately. The 
answer does not appear to be found in purposes of 
philosophic style, for Whitehead's style in Process and 
Reality leaves much to be desired. If this were his 
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purpose, it hardly seems adequate jus tification for the 
confusion and obscurity that results from his use of 
the two terms. Professor Emmet suggests that White-
head would have been less confusing if he had consis-
tently used the less ambiguous and more technical term 
'positive prehension.' This is undoubtedly true, but 
as Miss Emmet further points out, if such had been done, 
much of the meaning and import of the philosophy of 
organism would have been lost.l 
This consideration brings forth two items. Would 
the loss resulting from the exclusive use of 'positive 
prehension' be due to (i) the connotations of the 
term 'feeling' only, or {ii) to a distinction between 
the two terms on grounds other than conceptual conno-
tations? ¥tlss Emmet holds to (i) and does not consider 
that (ii) might also be a factor. It is the belief of 
this investigator that both (i) and (ii) are signifi-
cant. The determination of the connotations of the 
term 'feeling,' (i), and the significance of such con-
notative meaning for the subjectivist position is the 
final purpose of this section; but a delineation of (ii) 
is also a purpose and shall precede the final consider-
ation of (i). 
If Whitehead actually meant the two terms to be 
1. Cf. Emmet, WPO, Chapter IV. 
synonymous in naming the same thing, ~hen it seems 
that he would have interchanged freely the words in 
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respect to all types of feelings and positive prehensions. 
This he does not do. He speaks of physical feelings 
and physical prehensions, f'or example, but he never 
mentions propositional prehensions, or conformal or 
comparative prehensions while considerable discussion 
is attentive to propositional, conf'ormal and compara-
tive feelings. This suggests that Whitehead had some 
distinction in mind between the two terms, for these 
three types or phases of feeling cannot be said to be 
analytic components of either physical or conceptual 
prehensions. \fui tehead says, "There are three sue-
cessive phases of feelings, namely, ••• conformal feel-
ings, ••• 'conceptual' feelings, and ••• 1 comparative 1 
feelings, including 'propositional' feelings in the 
last species."l An analysis of these phases shall 
follow, but the significant thing to note now is that 
there is no equivocation of the terms 'f'eeling' and 
'prehension' in either the quotation or the context of 
the quotation. 
Further consider the statement, "The way in 1.vhich 
the feeling feels, expresses how the feeling c~~e into 
being. tt2 In this quotation there is a definite dis-
1. PR, 249. 
2. PR, 354. 
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tinction implied between the referent of the noun 'feel-
ing' and the verb 'feel.' There is an acting and that 
acting bring s forth or results in a subject or feeling. 
This brings to attention a problem mentioned earlier, 
i.e., how an action can be the actor, but it a l so seems 
to substantiate the distinction between prehension and 
feeling made in section three. That is, that one is 
a process, and the other is correlative to the process. 
It will be well to make this distinction more carefully .• 
It must be remembered that this distin ction seems to be 
suggested, and is not made explicit by Whitehead. 
A linguistic analysis in this instance appears 
to be highly fruitful, i.e., to what may it be sai d 
do the terms 'prehension' and 'feeling' refer? In 
Process and Reality there are found such statements 
as 1 the subject prehends' and 'there are complexes of 
prehensions.' Already there is a linguistic difference, 
i.e., between a verb and a noun. If it is remembered, 
however , that the subject is a process itself, then 
it becomes clear that the noun 'prehension' refers to 
the act of prehending. Thus, 'prehension' is the name 
of an act or process in abstraction. To what, then, 
may it be said does the verb 'prehend' refer? Primarily, 
the verb does not refer, that is, name; it states an 
action rather than pointing to an action. This all 
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seems rather obvious, but the difficulty is with the 
term 'feeling' in relation to 'prehension' and 'prebend.' 
•Feeling' is beset with difficulties in itself, for 
it has the properties of both verb and noun depending 
on context. For example, •the subject has a feeling' 
and 'the subject is feeling.' This equivocal character 
of the word is perhaps one of the factors leading to 
the ambiguity and obscureness of some passag es in Pro-
dess and Reality. The distinction between the nominal 
and verbal character of 'feeling' is of more complexity 
than the distinction between 'prehension' and 'prebend.' 
To make the initial distinction less ambiguous for fur-
ther delineating distinctions, the nominal 'feeling ' 
shall be referred to as 'feeling' and the verbal 'feel-
ing' as 'feel. ' 
Can it be said that 'feeling' and 'feel' are 
synonymous? No, for then ambiguity would forever 
reign. It seems, however, that this is what is entailed 
when Whitehead writes 11 This word 'feeling' is a mere 
technical term; but it has been chosen to suggest that 
functioning through which the concrescent actuality 
appropriates the datum so as to make it its own, 111 
and, the satisfaction "is the final characterization 
of the unity of feeling of the one actual entity."2 
1. PR, 249. 
2. PR, 251-252. 
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It is clear in the first passage that he meant 'feel' 
and in the second the proximity of 1 oft on either side 
of 'feeling' indicates the nominal use of the word as 
it refers to something. In t h e first, feeling is de-
fined as prehension was described in section three. 
For this reason it may safely be concluded that 'feel' 
is synonymous with 'prehend.' Is it that 'feeling' 
refers to the same process as does 'prehension'? This 
question epitomizes the whole problem, and it is doubt-
ful if it can be answered unequivocally in either the 
affirmative or negative. However, there is ir~licit 
evidence for a negative answer. 
In the above it was quoted that the completed 
actual entity, satisfied, is the unity of feeling. 
It may be argued that this is the unity of process, 
but this is not quite accurate. The satisfied actual 
entity is no longer an activity; it is the result of 
activity, the concrescent process. The concrescent 
process consists of prehensions guided by the subjec-
tive aim; and, "the concrescence issues in one concrete 
feeling, the satisfaction.ttl The satisfied actual enti;\zy 
is dead; "The process of concrescence terminates with 
the attainment of a fully determinate 'satisfaction.'tt2 
Here 'feeling' is used as the name of something other 
1. PR, 66. 
2. PH, 130. 
than process, something that is coincidental to acti-
vity. Satisfied actual entities are the actual world 
of the newly arising entities; they are the initial 
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data to be objec t iried. Now consider the first of the 
three stages in the process of feeling: 
(i) the responsive phase, (ii) the sup-
plemental stage, and (iii) t h e satisfac-
tion ••• In this phase Lfirsif there is 
the mere reception of the actual world 
as a multipli city of private centres 
of reeling.l 
Here again there is reference to feeling in the coin-
cidental context, i.e., feeling not identical with 
process. 
As one final consideration in the distinction 
between prehensions and feelings, it must be noted 
that Whitehead makes the implicit distinction not only 
on the basis of the satisfied entity, but also in the 
concrescent process itself as found in any single pre-
hension. He says, 
The 'prehension' of one actual entity 
by another actual entity is the com-
plete transaction, analysable into the 
objectification of the former entity 
as one of the data for the latter, and 
into the fully clothed feeling whereby 
the d~um is absorbed into the sub-
jective satisfaction.2 
Feeling thus is not only a phase of the total concres-
cence, but also a factor in prehension; that factor 
1. PR, 323. 
2. PR, 82. 
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which, in a sense, gives "body" to the prehension. 
This discussion, if not one of finality, has pointed 
up a problem in the interpretation of Whitehead's the-
ory of the organic subject. In the remainder of this 
investigation, as in what has preceded, this di££iculty 
is ever present. It does not seem to be a difficulty 
which can be resolved by either extensive investigation 
or by decision. The difficulty is not one which ac-
tually calls for decision in favor of either component 
of an exclusive alternation. The two meanings of feel-
ing are not incompatible. It seems very likely that 
Whitehead had both meanings in mind, and for this rea-
son, both meaning'S must. ~_be ~ kept in mind when reading 
Whitehead and his critics. Which of the two meanings 
he intends at each occurrence of 'feeling' can only be 
judged by reference to the context. This is not in-
fallible, however, for it has been seen in certain 
quotations above that both meanings were meaningful 
interpretations of the word in the context. 
The theory of feeling is perhaps the most signifi-
cant aspect of Whitehead's philosophy in respect to the 
subject. It is not the only significant factor, however, 
for mere feeling alone does not provide order and unity. 
Whitehead considers, however, that the t heory of feeling 
together with the ontolog ical principle is the backbone 
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of a philosophy of organism. It has previously been 
noted that 11 each actual entity is conceived as an act 
of experience arising out of data. It is a process of 
•feeling' the many data,nl and that "the process of the 
concrescence is a progressive integration of feelings 
controlled by their subjective forms."2 Thus it is 
that the udoctrine of 'feeling' is the central doctrine 
respecting the becoming of an actual entity."3 It must 
be remembered that in the following discussion of feel-
ing what was found to be true in the analysis of pre-
hension, subjective aim, and subjective form is also 
true of feeling, namely that "a feeling cannot be ab-
stracted from the actual entity entertaining it."4 
The analysis of prehensions proceeded according 
to the data; the analysis of feelings proceeds in the 
same way. Both the types of feelings and the types of 
data are similar to those found in the discussion of 
prehensions. There are, according to \ihitehead, 
three primary types of feeling which 
enter into the formation of all the 
more complex feelings. These types are: 
(i) that of simple physical feelings, 
(ii) that of conceptual fe elings, and 
(iii} that of transmuted feelings . 
In a simple phys i cal feeling , the 
initial datum is a simple actual entity, 
in a conceptual feeling , the ob j ective 
datum !Ls ._' an ·_ eterrial .:.Obj.ect ~ iil 'ca: ·- ·; t:imns-
1. PR, 65. 
2. PR, 355. 3. PR, 356. 4. PR, 338. 
muted reeling, the objective datum is 
a nexus of actual entities. Simple 
feelings and transmuted feelings mike 
up the class of physical feelings • . 
The notion of physical feelings is the notion 
of the basic, most primitive type of experience there 
is between the most primitive types of existents, 
actual entities. The nature of this primitive type 
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of experience, then, should present at least part of 
the primary factor of all experience in all phases of 
the universe, for "the actual entities of the actual 
world are bound together in a nexus of LPhysica17 
feelings."2 The primary experiential relationship is 
causation, and for this reason physical feelings are 
also termed by Whitehead as "causal feelings. 11 3 In 
extending the meaning compass of physical feelings 
Whitehead further says that all complex causal actions 
are complexes of physical feelings. Causal relation-
ship is only one phase of the physical reeling, however, 
for physical feeling is also the most primitive form 
of percep tion.4 Once again, consciousness is not in-
eluded in the meaning of perception. It is not exactly 
clear what Whitehead means by the term 'perception' 
except that in some way, as with causality, actual en-
1. PR, 354-355. Note the distinction of data. This 
distinction is tacitly assumed in the following. 
See above, Chapter II, and following. 
2. PR, 364. 
3. PR, 361. 
4. PR, 361. Note that 'perception' is not the ordinary 
mode of sense perception. 
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titles feel each other. The nearest approach that can 
be made to Whitehead's notion of physical feeling is 
in the fact of emotion. He says, "The primitive form 
of physical experience is emotion--blind emotion--re-
ceived as felt elsewhere in another occasion and con-
formally appropriated as a subjective passion."l The 
problem now is to determine Whitehead's meaning of 
•emotion.' In this instance he. is apparently using the 
term in its primitive meaning, for "the emotional appe-
titive elements in our conscious experience are those 
which most closely resemble the basic elements of all 
physical experience."2 
The emotional phase of physical feeling qualifies 
the causal phase of it. While a physical feeling is 
an experience of causation, it is not a pure mechanical 
transference. In the physical feeling there are al-
ways ele1nents of subjective novelty provided by the 
subjective aim of the entity to the subjective form. 
This is provided for by the categ orial demands. Thus, 
while the subjective form of a physical feeling is a 
re-enaction, it is not a complete re-enaction.3 The 
fact that there is novel subjective intensity in the 
physical feeling constitutes part of the basis for 
1. PR, 246 . Professor Emmet, incidentally, misquotes 
this passage by saying that "the primitive form of 
experience'• is emotion. Cf. WTO, Chapter IV. 
2. PR, 248. 
3. PR, 362. 
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Whitehead contending that the "subject of the feeling is 
causa sui.nl 
The elements of novel subjective intensity are 
exhibited further in the distinction found between 
"initial" and "objectivett datum. The initial data are 
all those past actual entities prior to objectification 
by any contemporary actual entity coming to be. Those 
data which are objectified become the objective datum 
of the coming actual entity. Thus, "objective datum" 
is a phase in the concrescence, but only one phase of . 
it. An objective datum .is an abstract entity referent 
to what was concrete, but no longer is; it is a part of 
the abstractive hieraDchy. This in conjunction with 
the fact that there is not an identical transference 
or re-enaction entails that there is a projective phase 
of the concrescence. That is, whenever there is sub-
jective novelty in the experience of an entity, there 
is some Kantian projection by that entity in its ex-
perience of data. Feeling is a dualistic relation; and 
if the feeling itself contributes novelty, then the 
data of the feeling are .felt in a certain way, i.e., 
subjective form guided by the subjective aim, just as 
the subject for Kant experiences the external world 
according to the forms of the sensib i lity. But where 
1. PR, 338. 
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for Kant this aspect constitutes the whole of experience, 
for Whitehead it is only a phase of the total experien-
tial relation. 
The datum of a simple physical feeling is of two 
orders. The 11 ini tial n datum :ls a past actual ent i ty; 
the ttobjective" datum is a simple physical feeling of 
the past actual entity.l This is to say that a simple 
physical feeling is "one feeling which feels another 
feeling . 112 This a gain points to the fact that objec-
tified data, actual entities, are each unities of feel-
ings which are the residue of the completed concrescent 
process. The subject, from the physical pole, then, 
is affectation. This is true of all subjects includ-
ing those of higher order such as persons. "All our 
physical relationships are made up of such simple 
physical feelings."3 
If simple physical feelings are causal in char-
acter, and the subject entertaining thes e feelings is 
the effect, does this not identify the cause with the 
effect? Whitehead answers in the affirmative in that 
there is a partial identification of cause and effect.4 
The identification is partial because there is not a 
complete transference of the objectified feeling, 
cause, into the simple physical feeling, subject. 
1. PR, 361. 3. PR, 362. 
2. PR, 362. 4. PR, 363. 
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Rather than there ' being identical transference or 
"re-enaction11 of the feeling in the initial datum, there 
is a "conformation" of the subjective :feeling with the 
objectified feeling. Feelings of this order are what 
Whitehead means by "conformal feelings."l 
The two primary types of :feelings, physical and 
conceptual, are classed according to both the type of 
data felt and the internal nature of the actual entity. 
Whereas the physical feeling issues from the physical 
pole of the subject and feels a feeling of another 
actual entity, the conceptual feeling has as its datum 
an eternal object and it issues :from the mental pole 
of the actual entity entertaining it. Physical feel-
ings are the primary physical experiences of an actual 
entity and "the primary mental operations are concep-
tual feelings.n2 This constitutes one of the two 
essential distinctions between physical and conceptual 
feelings. Conceptual feelings are not physical exper-
iences. 
The second essentialdistinction between physical 
and conceptual feelings rests upon the essential dis-
tinction between the data of the two :feelings, actual 
entities and eternal objects. Every actual entity in 




"must 11 enter into the concrescence of the subject by 
a physical feeling.l This follows from the ontological 
principle and the causal characteristic of physical 
feelings. Eternal objects, on the other hand, are po-
tentials and can be dismissed, but 'dismissal' means 
only that the eternal object is not realized, for the 
eternal object is nevertheless conceptually felt in its 
capacity for determinateness, including exclusiveness. 
_ The Category of Objective Diversity and the Category 
of Conceptual Reversion in conjunction with the fact 
that nincompatible alternatives is the ultimate fact 
in virtue of which there is definite character"2 ne-
cessitates that some eternal objects be excluded from 
realization. 
The subjective forms of physical feelings are 
basically emotional; but the subjective forms of con-
ceptual feelings are valuational.3 This follows from 
the first and seventh Categoreal Obligations of Sub-
jective Unity and Subjective Harmony. Of two incom-
patible eternal objects both may not ingress into the 
subject, for this would divide the subject into many 
subjects which violates the first category. In addition, 
the intensity or importance of the eternal object must 
be regulated. This is determined by the subjective 
1. PR, 366. 
2. PR, 367. 
3. PR, 367f. 
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forms or conceptual feeling s . The particula r value or 
the subjective forms is determined by the subjective 
aim which is what the subject is to be. 
The notion of transmuted feeling s is highly com-
plex, and this very complex ity constitutes the sig-
nificance of transmuted feelings for Whitehead's concept 
of the subject. It is through the operations of trans-
muted feeli ngs t h at the higher orders of experience and 
the higher orders of occasions arise. The feeling 
of nexus is one of the functions of transmuted feel-
ings, and consciousness and intellectuality arise from 
integrations of transmuted feelings. It is not neces-
sary that a complete delineation of the orders of trans-
muted feelings be given, for by their very nature t here 
is possibly an infinite number of types of transmuted 
feeling s. The significance of these can be gained 
through a brief exposition of their nature and origin. 
The simplest order of transmuted feeling is the 
physical feeling of a nexus as one entity. 1 The nexus 
is a unity of many physical and conceptual feelings 
whose referent w ·asociety of many entities with p o-
tential pattern, but these feelings are transmuted to 
the prehending occasion as one physical feeling. The 
notion of transmuted feeling s in abstract which covers 
1. PR, 384. 
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both physical and conceptual ~eelings is embodied in 
the Category of Transmutation.! Conceptual ~eeling s 
which have their origin in physical feeling s , and phy-
sical feelings which have their origin in conceptual 
~eelings , termed "hybrid" physical ~eelings, are also 
transmuted ~eelings. Nevertheless, both of these two 
types are de~inite physical facts as any transmuted 
~eeling is; thus "a transmuted ~eeling comes under the 
definition of a physical ~eeling."2 Transmuted feel-
ings also originate when the datum of one feeling is 
the same as the datum of a similar feeling in a subject 
~vhich preceded the feeling subject. This situation 
particularly arises in an instance of an occasion pre-
hending a nexus or nexus. 
Two other factors are inherent in transmuted feel-
ings which are expressed in the Categories of Conceptual 
Valuation and Conceptual Reversion. The fourth cate-
gory, Conceptual Valuation, describes one of the types 
of transmuted feelings alluded to in the previous para-
graph; that is, conceptual feelings are derivate from 
physical feelings whose data exemplify eternal objects, 
and these eternal objects are the data of the derived 
concep tual feeling. This category is highly important 
for the final discussion of the subject in its higher 
1. PR, 4o, 384f. 
2. PR, 387. 
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phases of integration. Primarily, the category sets 
forth the "principle that mentality orig inates from 
sensitive experience. 111 The fifth categ ory, Conceptual 
Reversion, is descriptive of a second phase involving 
conceptual feeling in the concrescent process; that is, 
that conceptual diversity is relevant to conceptual 
reproduction.2 There is conceptual feeling of eternal 
objects other than those felt through the primar y phy-
sical feeling . This category further limits the quality 
and intensity of reproduction of data in the feelings 
of the new entity. 
Consciousness is not a factor in transmuted con-
ceptual feelings; but the transmutation of feelings and 
the integration of transmuted feelings is the beginning 
of consciousness. Conceptual feelings rather are the 
rudiments of mentality as derived from physical, emotive 
experience. The analysis of the nature of the subject 
has led to just this. On the atomic level, the analysis 
is complete. It has been seen that the smallest puff 
of existence embodies the beginnings of the higher or-
ders of occasions which are characterized by the higher 
orders of experience. The simplest actual entity is 
emotive and perceptive. The problem that remains to 
complete the analysis of the concept of subjectivity 
1. PR, 379. 
2. PR, 380f. 
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is to determine how the higher orders of experience are 
accomplished. The initial basic feelings, physical and 
conceptual, have been analyzed; but "between the begin- , 
ning and the end of the integration into consciousness, 
there lies the origination of a 'propositional feeliRg.•"l 
The following section is concerned primarily with pro-
positional feelings and the data of such feelings. 
6. Propositions and Feelings 
The theory of propositions and propositional feel-
ings must be considered briefly for two reasons. Pro-
positions as metaphysical entities form a bridge be-
tween pure potentiality and pure actuality. This is 
of metaphysical necessity for a final provision of unity 
in the concept of the subject. Second, propositional 
feelings form an epistemic bridge between the higher 
orders of sentient experience and the primitive orders 
of sensitive experience. This is of epistemic neces-
sity in the final unity of the concept of the subject. 
Both are of equal importance for the total scheme of 
Whitehead's thought, but though propositions constitute 
one of the Categ ories of Existence, they are of impor-
tanbe ·.: ... to this investigation only from the standpoint 
that they are one of the types of data felt by the pre-
handing subject. Propositions stand in the same relation 
1. PR, 391. 
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to this investigation as do eternal objects and nexus; 
that is, they are of concern not as metaphysical theories 
or entities per ~, but rather as phases of the objec-
tive world that enter into the forming of subjects. 
According to Whitehead there is a "penumbral com-
plex" of entities the members of which are available 
as data for the prehending subject.l This complex is 
not composed entirely of eternal objects nor entirely 
of actual entities; it is composed of complexes of 
both. The best example is found in reference to his-
torical events. Given any historical event A, the 
actual world B as it is today is grounded on that event; 
but there are abstract notions concerning A which ex-
press possibilities for a contemporary actual world C 
which might have followed A. C is not actual, nor is 
it merely potential; it is a potentiality grounded on. a 
definite set of actualities. The elements of this 
twilight zone between pure actuality and pure potenti-
ality are called 'propositions.• "A proposition ••• is 
a hybrid between pure potentialities and actualities."2 
Earlier in this chapter it was pointed out that 
Whitehead posits a metaphysical entity of the Aristo-
telian subject-predicate form. These entities are pro-
positions. The subjects of propositions are definite 
1. PR, 282. 
2. PR, 282. 
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sets of actual entities; the predicates are the definite 
sets of eternal objects involved. This seems rather 
far removed from either an Aristotelian or twentieth 
century concept of proposition. The form is Aristo-
telian, i.e., subject-predicate, but it is questionable 
whether Whitehead's concepts of both the proposition 
and the predicate are similar to contemporary beliefs. 
The medieval sense of 'predicate' referred to the 
major term of a syllogism. Dating from Boole, 1~47, 
and Freg e, 1879, 'predicate' has come to mean any 
statement about any entity X. This was known to White-
head, and is used by him in this sense in Principia 
Mathematica. This fact causes one to wonder to what 
purpose Whitehead retains the medieval use of 'pre-
dicate.' 
Since the advent of modern logical analysis the 
term 'proposition' has come to mean that class of sen-
tences which have the same intens ional meaning . For 
example, the sentences 'That is a book' and 'Das ist 
ein Buch' express the same proposition, namely that a 
certain object is a book, but they are different sen-
tences. Whitehead does mean that the language spoken 
makes no difference, but it seems in the foregoing 
paragraphs that he limits propositions to just the 
class of contra-factual propositions. Consider, however, 
the definition of singular propositions,l 
A 'singular' proposition is the po-
tentiality of an actual world inclu-
ding a definite set of actual enti-
ties in a nexus of reactions involving 
the hypothetical ingression of
2
a de-
dinite set of eternal objects. 
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In other words, any statement of the conditional form 
'if ••• then---' is a proposition. That is, propositions 
are of three classes or types: (i) contra-factual of 
the form, 'if A did happen, then one of B or C or ••• n 
might have happened'; (ii) hypothetical present of the 
form, 'if A is happening, then one of B or C or ••• n 
can happen'; and (iii) hypothetical future of the form, 
'if A does happen, then one of B or C or ••• n might 
happen.' Thus it is that propositions are not limited 
in breadth of reference to just actual and past states 
of affairs. 
The inclusion of these various types of propositions 
into the class 'proposition' renders a formulation of 
a general theory of truth of propositions very difficult. 
A cursory examination of the following statements 
reveals that Whitehead perhaps is not clear whether or 
not propositions have a truth value. He says, "We shall 
say that a proposition can be true or false,"3 "A pro-
position must be true or false,"4 and "there is complete 
1. A general proposition differs from a singular pro-
position only in g eneralizing the subject. 
2. PR, 282. 
3. PR, 291. 4. PR, 392. 
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indeterminateness ••• as regards its LProposition'i7 
own truth ••• the proposition is in fact true, or false."l 
There appears to be flat contradiction here, and there 
is a contradiction if the Aristotelian notion that a 
proposition always refers to an actual state of affairs 
is presupposed. This is not a presupposition . for 
Whitehead. As noted in previous sections, states of 
affairs, i.e., actual entities, are either (i) objec-
tively immortal, (ii) coming to be, or (iii) not yet 
actualized. Thus, (i) a proposition must be true or 
false, (ii) a proposition can be true or false, and 
(iii) a proposition's truth or falsity is indeterminate. 
The subject of a proposition is always a definite 
set of actual entities in one of the three phases. The 
predicate is always a "potentiality. of relatedness for 
the subjects,n2 or a definite set of pure potentials. 
The proposition as a whole becomes "the possibility of 
~ predicate appaying in that assig ned way to those 
logical subjects.n3 The proposition states a potential 
predicative pattern of a prehended subject which may 
be different from the pattern actually or eventually 
exhibited by the actual entities. 
Whitehead says that the main function of propo-
sitions is not to be either true or false, rather it 
1. PR, 394. 
2. PR, 283. 
3. PR, 394. 
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is "as a lure for feeling"1 at the physical level or 
unconsciousness. The lure is constituted by the in-
deriniteness of the predicate. The lure for feeling is 
expressed by the subjunctive such that a definite set 
of actual entities might have been something other 
than what they are. It will be remembered that in 
section three it was stated that negative prehensions 
are instances of subjunctive by the fact of their 
function of elimination. Whitehead does not draw this 
correlation or even mention propositional feelings in 
relation to negative prehensions. It appears however 
that the origin of propositions and propositional feel-
ings is only possible as the result of negative pre-
hensions. It is not particularly germane to this in-
vestigation, but it may be questioned whether or no 
the function of propositions as data for feeling is 
identical to or derivable from negative prehensions and 
their effects on the entertaining subject. Either case 
effects a slight variation only in function from the 
other. 
The origination of propositions is not clear, but 
this is not of primary importance. The significance 
of propositions is that they are a type of datum which, 
as a hybrid between eternal objects and actual entities, 
1. PR, 281. 
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enters into the experience of the subject giving rise 
to a new order of feeling. - Such a feeling is called 
a 'propositional' feeling. A propositional feeling is 
the result of a synthesizing of physical feelings and 
conceptual feelings. This was noted in the last section 
in the discussion of transmuted feelings. The fusion 
of the objective datum of the physical feeling with the 
objective datum of the conceptual feeling, both suffer-
ing elimination, forms the datum of the propositional 
feeling. That is, objectified actual entities with a 
potential predicative pattern form the proposition for 
a propositional feeling.l 
There are two kinds of propositional feelings, 
imaginative and perceptive.2 These types are grounded 
upon a comparison between the physical and conceptual 
feelings which integrate toward propositional feelings. 
The data of the physical feeling provide the logical 
subjects of the proposition, and the feeling is there-
fore 'indicative.' The data of physical feelings also 
include ingressed eternal objects. The conceptual 
feelings of these eternal objects provide the predicate 
of the proposition.) If the two feelings are identical, 
perceptive feeling results, for the proposition pre-
dicates of its subjects the char cter which was actually 
1. Cf. PR, 393-394. Cf. also CN, Chapter I. 
2. PR, 397. 
3. PR, 397ff. 
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physically felt. If the two feelings are different, 
then the predicate of the proposition is not neces-
sarily relevant to the subject, although it may be, and 
an imaginative feeling is the result. Imaginative 
and perceptive feelings may be further subdivided, and 
their integrations with other types of feelings g ive 
rise to different orders of feelings. It is not neces-
sary to indulge in an analysis of these, for their sign!-
ficance stems not from their function nor orig ination, 
but from the fact that Whitehead posits them as p ossible 
and that they are developmental. The citing of imagi-
native and perceptive feelings is for the purpose of 
elucidating the nature of propositional feeling s in 
reference to the subject entertaining them. 
Propositional feelings do not involve conscious-
n e ss, but propositional feeling s are involved in con-
sciousness in that consciousness arises from integra-
tions of propositional feelings with other types of 
feeling s .l \ihat these other types are will be deline-
ate d in the next section. The subjective forms of 
propositional feelings are valuational in much the same 
way as are the subjective forms of conceptual feelings. 
That is, the value character of the subjective forms 
will depend on the seventh Cat0 goreal Obli gation of 
1. PR, 391. 
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Subjective Harmony.l The major function of the subjec-
tive form is in the role of decision. 
According to the various categoreal 
conditions, propositions intensify, 
attenuate, inhibit, or transmute, 
without necessarily entering into 
clear con~ciousness, or encountering 
judgment. 
The notion of propositional feelings which may 
or may not involve consciousness and judgment3 char-
acterizes the subject as progressive in evolutionary 
patterns. There is not a sharp distinction in White-
head's concept of subjectivity between the highest and 
lowest orders of experience, or existence. The lowest 
atom of existence contains within itself some deg ree, 
or rudiments, of the characteristics of the higher or-
ders of existence. This differentiates the subject in 
Whitehead from the subject in his contemporaries, 
Alexander and Bergson. Neither of them had a subject 
of experience as highly developed as does Whitehead. 
In addition, Alexander, for example, considered the 
qualities or characteristics of the subject to be 
emergent novelty. For Whitehead, they are in the subject 
all the time to a greater or lesser degree, depending 
on the subjective aim of the particular subject. Pro-
positional feelings are important from this standpoint. 
1. PR, 399, 402, 41. 
2. PR, 402. 
3. PR, 399. 
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The second significant factor about propositional feel-
ings is that they are an essential ingredient in the 
synthesizing of feelings toward consciousness. 
7. Consciousness 
In the beginning of this analysis of Whitehead's 
concept of subjectivity it was recognized that con-
sciousness is not a necessary factor for the experience 
of actual entities. Whitehead also makes this explicit 
early in Process and Reality, "Consciousness presupposes 
experience, and not experience consciousness ••• an actual 
entity may, or may not, be conscious of some part of 
its experience."! Because of this initial statement, 
questions regarding consciousness arose during the 
discussions. It i s fitting, then, that the synoptic 
analysis of the notion of the subject should conclude 
with consciousness. This is true even though conscious-
ness is not a primary condition of the subject such as 
is feeling and subjective aim, for in the notion of the 
conscious subject is found a final understanding of the 
subject itself, for "consciousness is the crown of 
experience.n2 
It will be remembered that consciousness is not a 
factor in, e.g., conceptual feelings . This fact alone 
1. PR. 83. 
2. PR, 408. 
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indicates something about the nature of consciousness; 
namely, that it is a factor in some way connected with 
feelings and that it is not a feeling itself. Conscious-
ness is ordinarily regarded as a continuum of experience, 
i.e., synonymous with experience, or a faculty by which 
experience is possible. A litt le reflection, however, 
leads to a view which considers consciousness as the 
form of some orders of experience. That is, conscious-
ness is the way one experiences, or how one experiences. 
Thus it is that Whitehead SJlYS that consciousness "is 
a special element in the subjective forms of some feel-
ings,"l and again, "Consciousness concerns the subjec-
tive form of a feeling ••• Consciousness is an element 
in feeling which belongs to its subjective form."2 
Though consciousness is a subjective form, to gain a 
full and ordered understanding, it is necessary first 
to consider the feelings to which the subjective forms 
belong. As iB previous discussion, feelings must be 
approached from the data of the particular feelings 
in question. 
In the previous section it was learned that the 
fully developed propositional feeling presents to the 
prehending actual entity a contrast3 between the ob-
jectified actual entities as felt in the physical 
1. PR, 83. 
2. PR, 369. 
3. A contrast of this order is a member of the eighth 
Categ ory of Existence, PR, 33. 
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feeling, i.e., matters of fact, and the same actual 
entities as logical subjects of a proposition in which 
the actual entities display a potentiality for the pre-
dicative pattern as expressed in the propostion. This 
contrast is the "affirmation-negation" contrast.l 
'Affirmation' because of the objectified fact in the 
physical feeling, and 'negation' because of the paten-
tiality in the proposition which negates the affirmed 
objective fact. The affirmation-negation contrast is 
"the contrast between 'in~~ and 'might be,' in 
respect to particular instances in~ actual world."2 
The affirmation-negation contrast is the datum of 
an "intellectual" feeling.3 Intellectual feelings as 
a class are subdivided into two types: "conscious per-
ceptions" and "intuitive judgments."4 Briefly, a 
conscious perception arises from the integration of a 
perceptive propositional feeling with the physical 
feeling from which the propositional feeling arose. 
A conscious perception is thus an intellectual feeling 
of the contrast between the datum of the physical feel-
ing and datum of the propositional feeling. In general, 
conscious perception is "the feeling of what is rele-
vant to immediate fact in contrast to its potential 
1. PR, 372. 407. 
2. PR, 407. 
3. Intellectual feeling s are of the class of comparative 
feelings mentioned in section five. 
4• PR, 406. 
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irrelevance. ttl 
An intuitive judgment arises from a feeling of 
the contrast between the indicative physical feeling 
and the proposition involved in the imaginative feel-
ing.2 Indicative and imaginative feelings were explained 
in the previous section. The term 'judgment' has its 
usual meaning. An intuitive judgment may be either 
affirmation, negation or suspension. In either of t he 
first two cases there may be error, but in the suspense 
form, there is no definite judgment expept the sus-
pension of judgment. Conscious perceptions may also be 
erroneous, but error in conscious perception stems from 
a different source than does error in intuitive judg-
ments.3 It is not necessary to analyze Whitehead's 
theory of true and false beliefs in respect to intellec-
tual feelings, i flo~c th~osignificance of intellectual 
feelings is not found in the minutiae of their ori-
gination and function, but rather it is found in the 
fact that they involve consciousness. 
The subjective forms of intellectual feelings are 
consciousness.4 In section four it was concluded that 
the subjective form in abstraction is basically emo-
tional, and that in it are found the rudiments of 
i . PR, 409. 
2. PR, L~l4. 3. cr. PR, 410-415. 4. PR, 407. 
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consciousness. It would seem, then, that consciousness 
is in some sense emotional or derived from emotion and 
valuation. This i s apparently what Whitehead means. 
The subjective form is inseparable from its feeling . 
The basic feeling of all experience is physical, and 
from physical feelings develop all the higher orders 
or feelings. That is, from physical feelings develop 
conceptual feelings, from conceptual feelings develop 
propositional feelings, and from propositional feeling s 
develop intellectual feelings. The basic subjective 
form or physical feeling is emotion, of conceptual feel-
ings it is valuation, and of intellectual feeling s it 
is consciousness. The development of feeling s and 
subjective forms is coincidental. The development of 
each accompanies the other. The development as briefly 
outlined here is an abstract generality or the highly 
complex development which involves integrations and 
contrasts, but the over-simplified abstraction serves 
to point up the fact in Whitehead's scheme that the 
higher orders and forms of experience are complex de-
velopments of radicals. This is put very succinctly 
by Whitehead: 
In the analysis of the origination of 
a ny conscious feeling, some component 
physical feelings are to be found; and 
conversely, whenever there is conscious-
ness, there is some component of con-
ceptual functioning .l 
1. PR, 370. 
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\ihitehead's definition of consciousness appears 
to be a very unusual one, but this is true only because 
it is restrictive. As mentioned earlier, conscious-
ness ordinarily is thought of as any sort of continuum 
of experience. That is, the animals lower than man are 
thought to be conscious in some sense. For Whitehead 
this is not true.l For consciousness to be a factor 
in experience there are necessary ·::c.o ·nditions which must 
be fulfilled. It is in these necessary conditions that 
the restrictiveness of Whitehead's definition is found. 
The necessary conditions are the conditions which g ive 
rise to the intellectual feelings, i.e., "there is no 
consciousness without reference to definiteness, af-
firmation, and negation."2 A particular could be some-
thing different, but it is just what it is. The feel-
ing of this affirmation-negation contrast is dependent 
on the definiteness of the particular entity involved. 
Consciousness, as a subjective form, is how t h e contrast 
is felt. It is not necessary to feel the contrast con-
sciously; it may be felt valuationally in respect to 
importance or unimportance. This is primarily what hap-
pens when the carrot is perceived by the rabbit as an 
object for food. Surely the carrot is not perceived 
as a hawk, but not-hawkness is not an element in the 
1. Cf. PR, 269. Nor is it necessarily true for man in 
all waking states. 
2. PR, 372. 
objective datum. On the other hand, consciousness 
is the feeling of negation: in the 
perception of 'the stone as grey,' 
such feeling is in barest germ; in the 
perception of 'the stone as not grey,' 
such feeling is full development. Thus 
the negative perception is the triumph 
of consciousness.l 
Value feelings are also the forms of a large part of 
man's immediate experience. In immediate experience 
there is feeling of objects and situations which may 
or may not be remembered. They are remembered if an 
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element of the subjective form of the feeling of that 
situation is transmuted into the subjective form of a 
present conscious feeling.2 Consciousness enlightens 
experience which precedes it.3 
With the necessary conditions of consciousness 
thus being a feeling of the contrast, the types of 
experience e~~ibited by the lower animals and some plants 
is relegated to the unconscious imaginative and percep-
tive feelings discussed in the previous section. \ihite-
head has been criticized for this restricted use of 
'consciousness,' and J ohnson contends that Whitehead 
has two meanings of the term, a common sense and tech-
nical meaning.4 The criticism that Johnson levies, 
however, seems to stem from (i) an insuf ficient analysis 
of Whitehead's theory of feeling in relation to common 
1. PR, 24.5. 
2. AI, 235f. 
3. PR, 370. 
4. Cf. WTR, Chapter II. 
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sense experience, and (ii) a failure to arrive at an 
explicit definition of 'consciousness' on even the 
common sense level. Common sense presupposes conscious-
ness as a function of the subject, but Whitehead clari-
fies this presupposition by restricting consciousness 
to the subjective forms of functions of the subject. 
Consciousness is how the subject functions at certain 
levels. 
The analysis of consciousness completes the de-
tailed analysis of the subject. The remaining chapter 
of the investigation is devoted to a final synthes~s · 
of the concept of subjectivity in Whitehead's philo-
sophy of organism, and the significance of the concept 
for a metaphysics of reality. 
CHAPTER IV 
El•lliRG ING CONCLUSIONS 
1. Identity of the subject and its experiences 
Throughout the entirety of this investigation there 
persistently has been the problem of the identification 
of the subject with the process of the becoming of the 
subject. The problem assumed several different forms, 
such as: how can an actor be nothing more than its ac-
tions?; how can actions be the actor?; and, how can 
feeling s feel? The problem is, essentially, that of 
determining if it is necessary that there be a subject 
as an existent condition of its experiences. 
The problem first arose in the discussion of the 
subjectivist prin~iple. 1 There it appeared that White-
head has a dichotomy between his meaning of 'subject' 
and his use of 'subject,' but it was concluded also 
that such a dichotomy was an accident of the structure 
of the natural language, Eng lish. Gentry fails to 
recognize this in his article. His statement, 
If the subject or feeler ••• is not an 
existent condition of its experiences 
or feelings, but rather a unity which 
emerges from its feeling s, why does 
Whitehead employ the concep t, or, at 
least, a languag e, which by philosophic, 
psy chological, and common sense con-
vention carries a meaning palpably 
1. Cf. Chapter II, section:_l. 
different from fhat he obviously wishes 
to communicate? 
not only fails to recognize that sentences in the 
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English language must be of the subject-predicate form, 
but also the statement has within it the fundamental 
answer to the question it raises. That is, Whitehead 
does not employ the concept which is different from that 
which he wishes to communicate; he only employs the 
language which is necessary by the accident of natural 
language. The subject in Whitehead is different than 
the common sense belief; but the language is the same. 
Gentry apparently failed to notice the 11 subject-pre-
dicate form of expression11 is "repudiated, in so far 
as concerns [J.ti/ influence on philosophy.n2 
The fact that this phase of Gentry's criticism is 
ill-founded, however, does not exonerate \ihitehead from 
the possibility that there is a contradiction in the 
notion of the subject as coming to be out of its exper-
iences. There are two considerations here: (i) the 
notion of process; and (ii) the results of an analysis 
of an experiencer apart from its experiencing. The 
second point also involves the subjectivist principle 
in that apart from experiencing there is nothing. 
Actually these two points are integrated in Whitehead. 
1. Gentry, Art.(l944) 222. 
2. PR, viii. 
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That is, the philosophy of organism is a philosophy 
of process, and the primary factor for analysis is sub-
jective experiencing. There seems to be nothing inher-
ently contradictory in such a notion. The problem arises, 
however, when it is contended that aside from exper-
iencing there is nothing. Even this is not an insur-
mountable problem. For example, it ean be said without 
the fear of a charge of meaninglessness that "running 
occurred today." It might be contended, however, that 
if running did occur today, there must be s omething that 
did the running. This objection reveals a predispo-
sition for the Aristotelian substance-quality doctrine, 
and it is precisely this predisposition that Whitehead 
repudiates. On the other hand, a subject divorced from 
its experiencing becomes a non-entity. That is, if 
all activity is removed from a subject, it is no longer 
a subject; the best it can be under sucl1 circumstances 
is an obj e ct of the past. This again is precisely 
Whitehead's point. Once the subject emerges from its 
experiences, all experiencing ceases and the subject 
ceases to be; it is then objectively immortal. 
The identity of the subject and its experiences 
has led to considerable confusion in the criticisms 
of Whitehead's philosophy. Such confusion has been 
enhanced by the fact that natural languages do not 
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readily lend themselves to "processu expression. For 
example , Gentry maintains that Whitehead "retains the 
essential function of the subject as ordinarily conceived, 
but drops ••• the subject in the sense of an existent 
presupposed by its feelings.ul The difficulty with 
this criticism is that it is not true. Gentry repeat-
edly fails to distinguish bet"Lveen the mode of expression 
and that which is expressed. Gentry continues in an 
effort to substantiate the statement. His argument is 
that the conception of a subject as striving toward 
some goal or aim presupposes a subject entertaining 
that aim.2 Let it be assumed that this is true; but 
is it a true correlate that either the subject enter-
taining the end or the subject striving toward the end 
must be the Aristotelian subject as ordinarily conceived? 
It seems not. There is nothing fundamentally contra-
dictory in the notion of value directed experiences 
from which the subject emerges as a completed unity. 
Gentry's criticisms stem mainly from a faulty 
analysis of the philosophy of organism. According to 
Gentry Whitehead develops the notion of the subject 
ad h££ to the primary metaphysical principles. These 
principles are, according to Gentry, (i) the ontolo-
1. Gentry, Art. (194L~) 223. 
2. Cf. Gentry, Art.(l944) 225. 
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gical principle which sets forth the internal relatedness 
of entities, (ii) the "atomicity" principle which posits 
the uniqueness of individuals, ahd (iii) the principle 
of emergent development. These principles are incom-
patible with the subject as ordinarily conceived. Thus, 
Gentry says, Whitehead develops the 11perverted" con-
cept of the subject as a synthesis of these principles.l 
The case seems t o be otherwise, however, Of the three 
principles mentioned, only one even resembles what 
Whitehead calls primary. The third principle resembles 
in Gentry's description the Category of the Ultimate, 
Creativity, but it properly is the first categoreal 
explanation. The other two are categoreal explanations, 
i.e., they are explanatory of actual entities rather 
than principles from which the notion of actual en-
tities is derived. The first Category of Existence is 
actual entities. It would seem, then, that the sub-
ject constitutes the primary metaphysical principle, 
aside from the Category of the Ultimate, and that the 
three principles above are explanatory of it. 
In considering Gentry's criticisms, the final 
solution to the problem of the subject is revealed. 
The question, Is it necessary that there m ·a subject 
as an existent condition of its experiences? if offered 
1. Gentry, Art.(l9~4) 222-223. 
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as a criticism or Whitehead is meaningless, for the 
question is framed from the Aristotelian mode of thought. 
Whitehead's answer to the question is, no. The funda-
mental notion of the subject is that it arises from the 
completion of value directed experience, and that what 
is presiding over the experiences is not a substantial 
subject, but rather a valuational directive constituted 
in the subjective aim. The substantial subject, rreely 
speaking, is the satisfied unity of feelings. But at 
this point, the subject is not substantial in the tra-
ditional sense, for the subject passes into objective 
immortality. 
The concept of subjectivity is thus clear. The 
final section of this chapter is concerned with the 
synthesizing of the significant characteristics or 
propeDties of the concept of subjectivity. 
2. Nature of the subject 
The one phase that remains is to summarily signiry 
the significant ractors in the development of the sub-
ject and the significant characteristics of the subject. 
The latter is to be understood, of course, as the 
significant characteristics or the becoming of actual 
entities. 
(i) The first factor noticed in the analysis of 
the concept of subjectivity is that the subject is 
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built up from its past. That is, the subject is not a 
self contained unit which is separated from the exter-
nal world; the subject is derived from the world as 
external to it. The subject is, therefore, not a sub-
stance which either totally projects qualities and re-
lations to a phenomenal world or "possesses" qualities 
in the traditional sense. The subject is neither li-
mited to the realm of cognitive experience nor to the 
realm of inert substance. Rather the subject is the 
fact of experience which pervades all of the unive r se. 
Both the notion of subject as substance and the notion 
of subject as the private condit1o.n for mental exper-
ience are repudiated. 
The subject is "derived" from its past and the 
external world in that it has a definite referential 
bond with each item in the m1iverse. The relation be-
tween a subject and ita external world is neither one 
of monistically acquiring qualities and attributes nor 
one of phenomenal knowledge as opposed to knowledge of 
the ding ~ ~· The relation is dualistically 
referential rather than either monistically acquisi-
tional or completely projectional. The subject as thus 
conceived, and the relation as thus conceived, makes 
possible the avoiding of the substance philosophies 
and the subjectivist prejudices of the order of Descartes 
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and Kant. 
(ii) The refer ential bond is not one of positive 
influence only. The subject is selective in regard to 
the significance of elements from which it is derived. 
That is, not all of the data are positively prehe nded. 
Some data are excluded from or valued down in the con-
crescent process. Thus, there is neither monistic 
repetition nor incompatibility of influences in the 
coming subject. Two factors mainly are responsible for 
the selective process: negative prehensions and sub-
jective aim. Negative prehensions are the means of 
selection, and the subjective aim is the g overnor as 
an end. The subject is conceived, then, in terms of 
value; it 11 decides 11 the relative importance of data 
for its own future. 
(iii) The selective character of the subject is 
the first step whereby novelty is introduced. Each 
subjective aim is novel, thereby adding something new, 
and the rejecti on of data eliminates total repetition. 
The subject is unique, different from all that preceded 
it. The mode of experience, i.e., subjective form, is 
also a factor responsible for novelty and uniqueness. 
The subjective responses of the subject to data are 
provisional of novelty. No two actual entities react 
to a datum in the same Hay. Thus, novelty is an im-
portant f'actor in the concept of subjectivity. 
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(iv) The subjective responses of the subject are 
primarily of one type, emotion, and secondarily of 
emotion and value. From these two orders of response, 
the higher orders of response such as consciousness 
are generated. The basic form of all experience is 
emotive. It has been suggested that at this point 
Whitehead is guilty of the "pathetic fallacy."1 This 
may be true, but prior to making the charge one must 
be careful in determining the meaning and extension of 
'emotion' in Whitehead. It was seen that Whitehead 
uses the term in referring to the most primitive form 
of emotion. Certainly there can be no objection to this, 
for the ramifications of emotion as cognitively exper-
ienced are infinitely varied. It seems highly probable 
that emotion in its most primitive form is the basic 
form of all experience. Surely the positing of pri-
mitive emotion as the basic form of experience of all 
subjects is fruitful in a metaphysical scheme. Emotion 
and value thus constitute the fourth primary character-
istic of the subject. 
(v) The primitive subject begins as blind, value 
directed, emotive experience of data which selects 
according to its own novel future, and which emerges 
as a unity of its experiences. The unity of experience 
is the crown of experience, for the satisfaction of 
l. See Emmet, WTO. 
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unity presents the subject into objective imraortality. 
In this sense, a subject never beg ins and never ends. 
The actual occasions of the present actual world are 
novel, but they also exhibit repetition; and they shall 
be exhibited as repetition in future occasions. 
The concept of subjectivity in Whitehead's philo-
sophy of organism embodies the concept s of: objective 
reference, value, novelty, emotion, and unity. The 
concept bridges the gap between the substance philosophies 
and the philosophies of subjective p h enomenalism, for 
the subject is also an object, and the subject may or 
may not possess consciousness. 
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ABSTRACT 
The history of philosophy has manifested diverse 
considerations of the subject of experience and the 
subject as the primary metaphysical entity or substance. 
Two positions have been prevalent: the Aristotelian 
aubstance philosophies, and the philosophies of sub-
jective phenomenalism. Whiteh ead's philosophy does 
not seem to fit either. Th~ concept of subjectivity 
as employed and formulated by Whitehead is available 
· for analysis only through a preliminary analysis of the 
Categorial Scheme. Thus, an analysis of the categorial 
scheme in its relevance to the concept of subjectivity 
precedes the analysis of the subject in Whitehead's 
philosophy. 
The method Whitehead employs is speculative, but 
it is firmly founded on scientific knowledge. White-
head justifies speculative philosophy on the grounds 
that it is only through the free play of imagination 
grounded in fact that interpretive knowledge is possible. 
Interpretive knowledge is the province of philosophy, 
and thus philosophy is never divorced from the other 
branches of knowledge. Further, the categ ories which 
are evolved in philosophy must be applicable to all 
areas of experience. The primary category of existence 
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is actual entities. They are the ~ verae. An actual 
entity is an act of experience arising out of data. 
This is contrary to the traditional substance philo-
sophies. Every actual entity has a definite referential 
relation with all other actual entities. This relation 
is prehension, which may be either positive or negative. 
The coming of actual entities is a concrescent process 
whereby many things achieve individual unity. Qualities 
are the result of prehensions of eternal objects or pure 
potentials. The i~ression of eternal objects into actual 
entities provides definiteness to the actual entities. 
Actual entities are both the subjects of experience and 
the "substance" of the universe. 
The analysis of the subject falls into seven divi-
sions: the subjectivist principle, the subjective aim, 
prehensions, subjective form, feeling, propositions and 
feelings, and consciousness. The primary data for philo-
soph~cal investigation are the experiences of subjects. 
Apart from the experiences of subjects there is nothing. 
Thus, actual entities are both subject and predicate, 
for as subject t h ey experience and as predicate 
they are expe r ienced. The reformed subjectivist 
principle repudiates Kant•s position and incorporates 
the essential features of empirical sensationalism. 
The experiencing of s ubjects is directed and not inde-
terminate. The factor which serves as a direction for 
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experience is the subjective aim of the subject. The 
subjective aim serves a value function in that it is 
the goal toward which the subject strives; it is, there-
fore, a unifying principle. The experiences of the 
subject are referential. Prehension is the primary 
activity exhibited in the experiences. Prehension 
involves all aspects of activity from the primitive 
physical operations to the primitive mental operations. 
The subjective form constitutes how a subject prehends 
a datum. Subjective forms are primarily emotive; how-
ever, in higher grades of prehensions they become 
valuational. Feelings are derivative from positive 
prehens ions, and constitute the f a ctors in the final 
unity of the subject. The completed subject is a unity 
of feeling. Whitehead makes no explicit 'distinction 
between positive prehensions and feelings, but there 
appears to be one. Prehension is the initial act of 
objectifying data, and feeling is t h e correlative p r o-
cess to prehension by which data are influential. 
Fee ling a s a p rocess is the ultimate kind of experience. 
Through the transmission and integration of feeling s 
the higher orders of expe r ience are possible. The two 
p rimary types of feeling s are physical and conceptual; 
nevertheless, conceptual feelings are derived from 
physical feelings. Propositions are the data or 
1~ 
propositional feelings, and propositional feeling s form 
an epistemic bridg e between the higher orders of sentient 
experience and the primitive orders of sensitive exper-
ience. Propositional feelings are an essential ingre-
dient in the synthesizing of feelings toward conscious-
ness. Consciousness is the subjective form of certain 
types of reelings. As a subjective form, it is grounded 
in the primitive subjective forms of emotion and valu-
ation. It arises only through the feeling of the con-
trast between fact and theory. That is, consciousness 
is how one feels the possibility of something being 
dif ferent than it is. The subject may or may not be 
conscious, depend ing on other factors such as the sub-
jective aim. Whitehead's restricted application of 
"consciousness" seems to be justiried by ordinary 
experience. 
Thus, the concept of subjectivity embodies the 
concepts of: objective rererence, value, novelty, 
emotion, and unity. The concept bridges both substance 
and phenomenalistic philosophies. 
